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VIENNA RADIO CORRESPONDENT REPORTS ON PRESENT-DAY ALBANIA

AU311200 Vienna Domestic Service in German 0500 GMT 30 Jul 80

[Report by Reinhart Hamman, Vienna Domestic Service correspondent, on his recent visit to Albania]

[Text] Tourists from our climes are very rarely induced to go to Albania. This is not surprising since word has gotten around that there is not much personal freedom of movement in that orthodox communist country which continues to hold Stalin in high esteem. Whosoever for example wants to take an evening stroll on the Adriatic coast at Durres soon runs into one of the ubiquitous representatives of the "Sigurimi," the Albanian state security service, who indicates not in so many words but by unmistakable gestures that the stroll has to come to an end where he stands.

All things considered, one should be obliged to the guard on duty because one could only too easily, and without ever wanting to do so, become an enemy of the state, for example by addressing another evening stroller who happened to have gotten into trouble in some way or other, and so it could be maintained that there had been a conspiracy. In that case, one might well be dragged before one of the new commissions of internment and exile, a sort of second legal system created by the all-powerful communist Albanian Workers Party. These commissions are not subject to the judiciary, concerning which the public has at least a theoretical insight, but subject to the state administration, which pursues the party's interests behind closed doors hidden from the public eye. The new commissions of internment and exile are competent to deal with anybody: Decree No 5,912 states that they have responsibility over Albanian citizens, foreign nationals and stateless persons who constitute a threat to the social order of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

There is hardly an Albanian who is aware of the existence of this wanton legal instrument. When the party paper ZERI I POPULLIT reported on the People's Assembly meeting of the day on which these commissions were established, there was only mention of decrees that had been adopted, and not a word about their content. The reason for this is obvious:

The commissions of internment and exile are further proof of the fact that there are internment camps in Albania, which the courageous also call concentration camps. Previously, the clique surrounding the Hoxha and Shehu families, anxious for their power position and governing the small isolated country at their discretion under the slogan of "pure teachings of Marxism-Leninism," had to take suspects to court before imposing the punishment provided--in the form of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of a death sentence for alleged high treason. Now the anonymous commissions of internment and exile assume responsibility for most of the trials which previously provided a yardstick of the considerable political resistance against Hoxha's socialism.

The commissions are also competent to deal with foreign nationals who, as it is said, have committed "crimes outside Albanian territory against the state the effects of which are still to be felt." Any foreign journalist, for example, who, abroad, writes critical remarks about Albanian policies, stands a fair chance of having a file established in his name by the internment commissions, just in case. Albanian penal law not only forbids the questioning of the high ideological ideas of party chief Hoxha, but it also forbids the criticizing of other socialist states. It is only fortunate that in the meantime the Albanians have come to despise all other communist states to a degree which makes it impossible for them to detect any socialist traits in them whatsoever.

CSO: 2300

POPE'S VISIT TO BRAZIL DENOUNCED

AU291120 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 18 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Cicani: "Pope's Diversionary Trip to Brazil"]

[Excerpts] The Vatican's political and diplomatic activity at the service of bourgeoisie and world imperialism is becoming increasingly more intensive. The Vatican's leader, Pope Wojtyla, is criss-crossing the world, conspiring at the expense of the working masses so as to undermine their struggle for national and social liberation. Following his trip to the continent of Africa, where he presented himself as a missionary of neocolonialism and enemy of the struggle waged by the peoples of Africa for national and social liberation, the pope recently concluded a 12-day mission in Brazil. Anticipated in his political activity is also a visit to Jerusalem at a time when the Zionist Israelis have proclaimed Jerusalem as their capital city.

All this political activity is not accidental. It is well planned for those regions where international imperialism mostly senses the need for religious demagogy so as to neutralize the movement of the broad working masses and change the political situation in its favor.

Seen in the light of its entirety, the pope's Latin American mission was of a deeply antipopular and reactionary nature intended to confuse and corrupt the Brazilian people and the other people of that subcontinent, weaken and paralyze their revolutionary fervor and political consciousness and remove them from the road of the class struggle.

However, all these demagogical maneuvers of the Vatican cannot mislead the peoples. The Brazilian people and the other peoples of Latin America do not pin their hope for progress, democracy and social justice upon the pope's pleas and preachings, nor on the promises of Figueiredo and other dictators and the imperialist and social imperialist..."aid." "As the only indispensable means to secure national and social liberation, the idea of the revolution," Comrade Enver Hoxha has stressed in his book "Imperialism and the Revolution," "is increasingly getting deeper and wider into the conscience of the proletariat, toiling peasantry, progressive intelligentsia and youth...." The people of the Latin American countries are also becoming ever more aware of that.

CSO: 2100

HIGHER TRADE UNION ROLE IN PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT INDISPENSABLE

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech 9 Jul 80 pp 1,4

[Interview With Vladimir Marik, Secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, by Oldrich Bilovsky--Date and Place Not Given]

[Text] In his closing address at the 15th Plenum CPCZ Central Committee, Comrade Gustav Husak stated that "at the present time, the party is focusing its efforts primarily on the urgent tasks connected with the realization of the conclusions of the 15th congress through fulfilling the national economic plan for the current year." The role and responsibility of the economic organs, the organizations joined in the National Front, and all working people are being increased. And the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement has a significant role in the growth of the effectiveness of the economy and of the quality of production, in the introduction of scientific and technical advances, and in bringing about increased output and productivity.

The last, ninth, plenum of the URO [Central Council of Trade Unions] concerned itself with the evaluation of the level of application of the rights and obligations of plant committees of the ROH [Revolutionary Trade Union Movement] and the trade union organizations in the implementation of the conclusions of the Fifteenth CPCZ Congress and the Ninth All-Trade Union Congress; on the basis of the conclusions of the 14th and 15th sessions of the CPCZ Central Committee, it appraised further the tasks and the effects of the collective agreements in solving economic and social tasks, and in the development of ideological educational action. We requested an interview on this subject from Vladimir Marik, Secretary of the URO, Dr of Social Sciences, Dr of Jurisprudence.

[Question] The achievement of a turnaround in the development of the national economy is conditioned by the further growth of the creative activity of people. What effect will this requirement have on the activity and mission of the basic organizations of the ROH and the ROH plant committees?

[Answer] The need for increasing the participation of workers in management and the further development of their creative activity is also emphasized by the Set of Measures for Improving the Planned Management System of the National Economy. This document was adopted by the CSSR government and includes the responsibility of state and economic organs and organizations to respect the rights of trade unions, which are implanted in the resolutions of the Fourth All-Trade Union Congress on the position of the ROH plant committees, and to act according to the labor code and in accordance with other regulations. In this regard, I would like to state that the Ninth All-Trade Union Congress decided to study the implementation of the resolutions of the fourth congress on ROH plant committees in the practical conditions of basic organizations. Thus, it forms the basic political and legal norm for the activity of the ROH plant committees. We have been concerned with this task: tests were carried out in 370 plants and enterprises (roughly 400,000 people work in them). It was proved that conditions and binding guarantees have been created in the legal regulations for the plant committees as the representative organs of basic organziations of the ROH, with regard to the binding nature of the positions and decisions of trade union organs. Thus, these questions were also deliberated by the ninth plenum of the URO. It was stressed that the resolutions of the Fourth All-Trade Union Congress on plant committees reflect the Leninist concept of the role of trade unions in a socialist society. Certainly--and this has to be seen--political instruments and legal regulations are an important condition for the implementation of the tasks of the movement; however, they cannot be sufficiently effective without the activity of the members. And this applies in full measure when one speaks of the aforenoted resolutions of the Fourth All-Trade Union Congress, which make possible the day-to-day activity of plant committees--the main bodies charged with implementation of trade union rights and responsibilities.

[Question] From what you have stated, Comrade Secretary, one comes to the conclusion that improvement of the quality of the work of trade union organizations is a condition for the further intensification of the participation of people in the management and administration of plants. However, the application of legal rights of trade unions and the fulfillment of their obligations is also an inseparable component. What is the situation in this direction in the basic organizations of the ROH?

[Answer] I'll be frank about it: uncoordinated, uneven, and unbalanced. Only less than half of the plant committees use all of their authority and fully abide by their responsibilities. Furthermore, roughly 30 percent do so with specific deficiencies. There are a wide range of reasons. Certain plant committees implement authorizations separately, by delegating all their authority to subordinate organs by their own decisions; in other places, there is excessive concentration in a body's own competence, and other places, there is too much dispersion to shop committees, and eventually, even to trade union

sections. It is even this way with questions, when it is necessary to define a united stand on the national economic plan, on the directions of socialist competition, etc. The problems also stem from the industrial managers. Most of them understand the political and legal positions of the trade unions. This means that they acknowledge them in word. However, in practice, many times, they act completely to the contrary. There are even individual cases when we encounter the views of certain managers who believe that the rights of trade union organs limit their management activity, and impede them in their operational decisionmaking. This stems from insufficient knowledge of the rights of plant committees or from a narrowminded shortsightedness.

[Question] Therefore, the situation is not bright. What do you consider to be most decisive in order that the basic document for the work of plant committees of the ROH be respected, used, and be fulfilled in all its functions.

[Answer] At the 15th Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, in his closing address, Comrade Gustav Husak said: "Now, what is going to matter is to give an appropriate and critical evaluation in all sectors of what we are succeeding in doing, and what is producing an effective result, and on the other hand, where the weak spots are that we have to overcome." When we are speaking about exercising the rights and the fulfillment of the responsibilities of the trade unions, it will be necessary for the plant committees in all basic organizations of the ROH to explain their positions again. It has to be thus, because they are shouldering a massive responsibility for the fulfillment of the tasks concerning the development of a socialist society. This concerns an urgent requirement. It is also reinforced by the fact that during the study, 55 percent of the officials of the plant committees of the ROH expressed the view that often the reason for failure to use the rights is the result of bureaucratic red tape, evasion of problem solving, routine procedure, and, especially in the wage area, fear of rocking the boat. Often, this goes so far that for the price of concessions and wage leveling, goof-offs and chronic absentees are retained in a plant. I would define the aforenoted problem as the main cause of deficiencies in the implementaiton of the resolutions of the Fourth All-Trade Union Congress and the Labor Code.

The tasks, nevertheless, are gigantic. We must be up to them. There is just no other alternative. This means that since many deficiencies and bureaucratic practices during discussions of tasks so far were permitted to undergo only perfunctory control, problems have come about. At a stage when concern will have to be accorded to the realization of the Set of Measures for Improving the Planned Management System, such a procedure would become a impediment, a serious obstacle. And this cannot be allowed. Insofar as this concerns greater participation of people in the management and administration of plants and enterprises, it is necessary to link the broadest possible circle of workers and other working people to this process, and to make sure that this participation be truly effective. It is the goal to have an ever-increasing number of people share in the solution of labor and social concerns. After all, the idea of the law on plant committees lies in this goal.

[Question] What is concerned here, therefore, is to complete the rights; thus, it is equally necessary to increase the mutual responsibility of the trade unions for the development of the economy, for management, and for work incentives. I have in mind a new quality of obligation of the position of trade union organs for the draft plan, which is imbedded in the Set of Measures for Improving the Planned Management System. What is involved here?

[Answer] We're talking about the right of trade unions to express themselves as regards the economic plan. I may have called this a right, but what is involved here is also a responsibility. And many organizations, even industrial managements do not fulfill it. For example, this year, somewhat over 11,300 basic organizations of the ROH submitted their viewpoints.

In the Set of Measures, the responsibility has already been established for economic management to discuss every draft plan with the appropriate federal trade union organ, to seek out its ivew, and to propose it as an integral component of the draft to its superior organ. The latter is then obliged to inform the trade union organs on how it was used. The purpose of the measure--and in this, we see a new quality--is to have the viewpoints of plant committees express views based on the collective production experience of workers and other working people.

[Question] In the Set of Measures for Improving the Planned Management System, emphasis is placed on the quality of all work. However, compensation payment will also have to be adjusted to the new requirements. And it is in the wage area that the trade unions hold their most important positions. Will these be used?

[Answer] Just a little for now. It appears, for example, that roughly one-third of the plant committees have not been solving the problems of classifying and implementing wage and award funds, or are dealing with them incorrectly. And at the same time, it is going to be one of the most complex tasks to enlist people in the realization of measures for intensifying their economic stake. We cannot even exclude the fact that the measures implemented will disturb those who have been nurtured by wage leveling and little demand for quality work. This is something you have to expect. For the trade unions and the plant committees, this means the development of efforts to avert unneccessary disputes that arise as a result of misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or inconsistent practice. In any case, the requirements on the arbitration commissions of the ROH plant committees will continue to increase. Of course, the consistent application of socialist compensation for work is one of the decisive, but currently weakest sectors of mutual responsibility of the trade unions in the economic field. Let us require every official of the ROH, especially the members of the plant committees and wage commissions, to be guided constantly by the principle that good wages are deserved only by those who perform high quality work.

[Question] Collective agreements are an important political, economic and socially legal instrument for the development of the participation of people in management and in monitoring the plants and enterprises. It is their goal

to be an effective means for increasing the effectiveness and quality of all work and to contribute to the intensification of concern for the workers. Is it fulfilling these functions?

[Answer] At the seventh plenum of the URO in September of last year, we stated that a certain formalization of the content of collective agreements has come about, their functions have declined, and work with them has lessened. At the same time, stress was given to the requirement for them to become one of the basic documents guaranteeing and elucidating the merger of the interests of society and the plant collective. It was emphasized that the situation is alarming when many plants have no collective agreement at all, and when many of those that have them do not live up to their functions. I have information at my disposal on the level of agreements concluded for this year. It is higher than that of last year. The most demanding obligations turn up in the agreements in experimental enterprises. There, also, their contents were motivated significantly by interest in economic questions. However, many are suffering chronically from generalities and non-obligatory formulations, and lack provisions for adequate differentiation of wages. And it is right in this aspect that the collective agreement is supposed to have an effect as a norm-setting legal instrument for the individualization of prevailing wage regulations for the conditions of whatever enterprise or plant is concerned. In addition, according to the obligatory document of the CSSR government and the URO, they were supposed to have been enacted before 15 January. In some cases, the deadline was not met, however, one-fifth of these documents were enacted in March, and some even later. It is not a matter, perhaps, of people who abide by formal procedures; of course, the conclusion of collective agreements within a certain period is an expression of the necessary political, economic, and legal assuredness of working collectives. In the meantime, therefore, it is impossible to talk about a fundamental turnaround. Cases have even occurred where the enterprise collective agreement was adopted before the plant committees even had a chance to familiarize themselves with it beforehand. There are always inadequacies with regard to monitoring; in many cases, such monitoring has the nature of more or less a "tabulation," without participation of the people.

[Question] As far as I have been informed, the central committees of the trade unions have the task of transplanting the 5-year sectorial collective agreements from the ministry into practice. What will be their mission?

[Answer] It is necessary to state beforehand that the role of the collective agreements will continue to increase. The responsibility of economic and sectorial organs for their conclusion will increase in particular. And this applies to production plants, budget organizations, and other organizations. Since this concerns the 5-year trade union collective agreements, they will be directed toward the unification of the interests of the working collectives in the planned economic and social development of their entire sector, toward the provision for the long-range tasks of the plan and the marking out of basic wage concepts. In no way will this reduce the importance and purpose of annual plant agreements. Quite the contrary, the concrete joint obligations of the collective of workers and the economic management will show up in

these; obligations toward higher profitability and quality of products, for assuring a balanced fulfillment of the plan, toward the utilization of reserves, etc. The purpose of all the measures is that from the collective agreements on the level of sectors, enterprises, and plants, there would emerge an influential and mobilizing instrument for economic and social policy and for the individual program of a trade union organization. And this kind of approach evokes the interest of people. It is this way that their proper participation will be assumed in the formation and monitoring of these documents. In this approach, the plant committees of the ROH jointly with the public control authorities are preparing [plan] fulfillment during the first half of this year: they will also be concerned with the preparation of collective agreements for the five-year plan and for annual periods. We anticipate that they will continue to increase in scope and will become an expression of the dual role of the ROH and an effective instrument of the active participation of people in the management of production and the development of socialist democracy.

5808
CSO: 2400

LISTY EVALUATES IMPACT OF 'SET OF MEASURES'

Rome LISTY in Czech No 3-4, Jul 80 pp 6-9

[Article by Rudolf Slansky, printed without consent of the author: "Will the Set of Measures Resolve the Current Economic Difficulties?"]

[Text] Czechoslovakia's economic situation is extremely grave. Economic growth has slowed significantly, and the standard of living--the best indicator of economic efficiency--is only stagnating at best. We are lagging farther and farther behing the developed countries because our economy has not shown itself able to adapt to the new world situation. All this demonstrates that the current methods of its management are imperfect. Therefore the Set of Measures for Improving the Planned Management System of the National Economy has evoked significant public interest. People would be glad to know whether it can help to overcome the current difficulties.

This set of measures is contained in a relatively long document. Not everyone has had the patience to read through it, to say nothing of studying it carefully. I shall therefore try, very schematically, to describe the content of its basic positions.

The Set of Measures is divided thematically into two basic areas. The first contains measures strengthening the authority of the central administrative agencies, particularly the State Planning Commission and industrial branch ministries, thereby increasing the extent of centralization and the directive character of economic management. This will become evident from the fact that the center will limit to a still greater extent the freedom of decisionmaking in many areas of the enterprise sphere. It will, for instance, assign about 70 percent of the volume of enterprise output. In connection with this the extent of managed, i.e., basically rationed, raw materials, fuel, and energy is expanding, and imports are being more severely restricted. A natural consequence of this centralization of decisionmaking concerning a majority of the production program is also that a number of marketing and supplying activities will be carried out by ministries, even though it is obvious that the imbalance in the supply and demand relationships of raw materials, fuel, energy and manufactured goods

cannot be eliminated in this manner. The limitation of enterprise contracting freedom is only one manifestation of the limitation of the activity of the enterprise sphere. It is also restricted in other ways. The detachment of production from foreign trade and world markets is maintained. This simplifies nothing, rather it complicates the reaching of cooperative and licensing agreements with foreign countries. The centralized determination of the prices of all products and services is retained intact. The number of workers is more strictly limited, and new limits are introduced on the numbers of technical-managerial employees. Technical development, in the retardation of which the difficulties of our economy are most clearly manifested, will be fettered to an even greater extent by bureaucratic planning "from above."

Centralization will be strengthened within the enterprise sphere as well. The basic management units will be exclusively of a manufacturing character--economic units--and under no circumstances enterprises. The subordinate position of the enterprise is further emphasized by the fact that those which had been combined into trusts, and therefore possessed a number of significant economic and management prerogatives, will lose them to concern or sectoral enterprises.

The second area of problems treated in the Set of Measures is concerned with the introduction of new economic instruments or indicators aimed at reinforcing the interest of economic production units, or enterprises, in the fulfillment of the central targets and to compel them not to neglect efficiency considerations, technological development, etc.

The indicator of value added is introduced as the main indicator for the evaluation of enterprise activity. Unlike the gross output indicator, it does not include the value of purchased materials and subcontracted deliveries. This is supposed to prevent enterprises from facilitating plan fulfillment by utilizing more expensive or heavier materials and semi-manufactured goods, or through unnecessary, and often counterproductive, agreements with other enterprises. However, the value added indicator has its own shortcomings. As does the gross output indicator, it places greatest value on the number of manufactured goods, on their quantity, and does not evaluate quality, the efficiency of the whole manufacturing process, and labor quality. In addition, it also contains the possibility for enterprise speculation: the enterprises will be able to improve plan fulfillment by wasting labor rather than by wasting material. Because the internal production indicator does not express production efficiency, it was necessary to establish a number of additional indicators. Particularly great emphasis is placed on profit, the amount of which will determine to a large extent (under no circumstances, however, completely) the volume of resources available to the enterprise for its own use. In order to stimulate the interest of enterprise collectives in increasing efficiency, a series of rules is established, many of which are quite complicated and involved, by which the connection is determined between the amount of resources available for use for wages, bonuses, premiums and shares) for subsidizing the cultural and social services fund and the development

fund; and the level of fulfillment of the plan for production, technical development, the profitability of operating assets, the achieved volume of working capital, the size of deliveries for foreign trade, etc. So that enterprises can finance the greater part of their needs from internal resources the amount of tax on profits and on depreciation for the federal budget is lowered. It is not a question, however, of a simple shifting of resources. At the same time, that is, the new wholesale prices which will be introduced in 1981 and 1982 will lower the share of the profit which more severe conditions will create for enterprises. By the same token, these changes will prohibit the inclusion in product prices of the results of increases in the prices for fuels and raw materials which will occur even outside the period of price restructuring.

These economic instruments will not, however, be automatically valid. In practice, the center reserves the right of intervention into the operations of all enterprises. As an example, one may cite the right to redistribute profits among economic production units at the ministry level, and the limiting even of those investments for which an enterprise has earned the resources. The Set of Measures contains as well a number of formulations which are most accurately viewed as goals towards which management is supposed to strive. Most of them are repeated in every document, in every speech, year after year, without visible results or effects. Many words are dedicated in this vein to problems of improving the planning mechanism at all levels and strengthening plan targets. Hopes are also placed on implementational counterplanning. Much is expected as well from a broadening of the obligatory evaluation of the technical sophistication and quality of products, even though it is clear that there are no better examinations than those which they receive on the market, especially the foreign market. And again there are words about higher demands on "key personnel" and their training, especially professional training, and about greater worker participation in management.

The mission of the Set of Measures is the improvement of the economic mechanism, i.e., planning systems, methods and means of detailed plan breakdown and plan evaluation, systems of material indicators and stimuli, the organization of management, including the division of authority among individual management levels. However, the most internally perfected mechanism is worth nothing if there are not at the same time properly outlined goals which this mechanism is to guarantee the achievement of, if there are no properly formed material relationships within the national economy which constitute a basic framework for the achievement of these goals (here I have in mind, for instance the rate of national economic development, the content of the principal manufacturing programs, the extent and orientation of investment, consumption's share of national income, foreign trade relations, the means of incorporation into CEMA country integration and the commitments which flow from this, military expenditures, but also the amount and means of resource distribution between the Czech and Slovak lands or the assistance given countries such as Vietnam,

Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, etc). These fundamental goals and proportions are determined in our country by high political and state agencies as a component of the realization of their own political conceptions. Therefore, it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of the Set of Measures apart from the general conditions of the functioning of the political system and the socio-political and moral condition of the society formed by this system.

Let us try to determine whether the economic mechanism will change following the implementation of the measures contained in the Set of Measures, and what the results of these changes will be. It is very evident that the fundamental tendency of the Set of Measures is the strengthening of the authority of central agencies at the expense of the enterprise sphere, i.e., the centralization and directive character of management. The conditions for enterprise activity will be created to a decisive degree by the center, not only through decisions which influence the course of the national economy as a whole, but also through decisions determining the specific content and conditions of operation of every single enterprise, every economic production unit. The sole requirement placed on economic instruments is that they support the interests of enterprises in fulfilling the goals of the center in such a way that efficiency considerations are not completely neglected. The role of the enterprises, therefore, is reduced still more drastically than before to that of mere executors of the directives of the center, and only minimal space is left for the influence of the economic indicators.

The rejection of centralization and directive-administrative methods of management is unthinkable under any circumstances. There are times when it is just this centralization which makes possible the achievement of a precisely defined goal in a relatively short time, and for which it is necessary to concentrate a maximum of a society's resources, as in the rapid industrialization of an underdeveloped country, in preparing a country for war or while waging it, or in postrevolutionary periods during the carrying out of great changes in ownership and production relations. Centralization has, however, negative outcomes if it is only a means for concentrating a maximum of power and resources in the hands of a narrow power group or individual with the objective of maintaining control against opposition or over an indifferent majority of society.

An emphasis on quantitative indicators is common to a directively administered management system. The problem is that if decisions are made for too long on this basis, productive efficiency declines, technical development stagnates, and the national economy is not efficient as a unit. There are two main reasons for this. First, the center is interested during decisionmaking primarily, concretely, in a material expression, in what the economy can achieve. It is more interested in how much coal will be mined, so that factories will not stop and people will not freeze, than at what cost this coal will be mined and how the mining disrupts the ecological balance of entire regions. It is more interested in the amount of resources which must be devoted to the personal consumption of the population than in the issue of whether the people will be satisfied with what they buy. It

concerns itself more with arranging for the necessary number of police employees than about the source of their wages. The second reason stems from the reality that during this decisionmaking process it is necessary to establish an enormous number of concrete targets for a huge number of economic production units over a given time period, with given resources, and a given number of workers about the abilities of whom one cannot have too many illusions. Therefore, it is impossible to take into account all the relationships and ties among them, but primarily those of an economic nature, because at the enterprise level these ties are too detailed and complex and, at the same time, apparently dispensible during decisionmaking regarding quantitative relationships. The negative results of this approach often become evident only in a few years. In the meantime it is possible to nurture illusions about the ambitious goals which the economy will reach in the future.

In spite of the fact that economic instruments are established, the center does not attach fundamental importance to them. This is clear from the fact that it has left to itself the possibility, in practically all instances, of limiting their effect or invalidating their results through administrative intrusions. In this way uncertainty arises in the enterprise sphere as to whether it makes sense to devote too much attention to production efficiency. For instance, enterprises which attempt to manage themselves well do not know whether the profit which they have generated will stay with them or be taken away on behalf of poorly managed enterprises. Poorly managed enterprises or, more precisely stated, enterprises which do not achieve specified economic results, know that their evaluation according to economic indicators is not precise and objective, because the decisive factor influencing results is not enterprise activity, but the activity of the center, and therefore they count on the support of the center. For the same reasons the center cannot oppose or take away bonuses for any large collective of workers or technicians, because an awareness of the injustice of such a decision would necessarily lead to a still greater decline in work interest, or--from the viewpoint of the political leadership of the country to something worse--to strikes, to the disruption of peace in society. Therefore it prefers to alter the plan, or quietly agrees to announce that unfulfilled targets have been fulfilled.

That centralized decisionmaking and administrative methods of management lead to a decline in the efficiency of a national economy is being demonstrated as well by the experiences of our country. After more than a decade-long period of operation of this system in the fifties, stagnation came upon our economy in 1961 to 1963, and even led to a decline in the standard of living of the population. We are in a similar situation today as well, after an additional decade long period.

If it is necessary to place principal emphasis on economic efficiency, then the best results may be expected from a combination of planning, along with economic management methods, and with a significant degree of decisionmaking decentralized from the center to the enterprise sphere. If a limited number

of indicators are established for enterprises, outlining essential social priorities, and the enterprises are allowed to determine to a large extent a manufacturing program and technical development priorities, to set prices and establish supplier-user relationships--at the same time that this decisionmaking is directed by the credit, financial, price, and foreign trade policies of the center--then it is possible to expect that significant agreement will be reached between the interests of individual enterprises and the society. Economic efficiency never increases as a result of implementing gigantic and investment-intensive projects, but through the implementation of numerous microeconomic changes at the enterprise level, i.e., technical development, and technological and organizational changes financed primarily from enterprise resources and in accordance with enterprise interests.

A second source of improved economic effectiveness are changes in the functioning of a political system. The achievement of a turnabout in the unfavorable economic situation of the early sixties was without doubt aided by a lowering of tensions which had accumulated in society over many years--for instance, the partial rehabilitation of the sacrifices of the fifties and the opening of discussions on economic and sociocultural themes, both of which made possible active participation in the implementation of economic policy by a greater part of society than previously.

Why then in the current situation, when an effective way out would be decisive decentralization of economic management along with the creation of space for the activity of economic management methods, is centralization on the contrary deepening, although it is obvious that this can only worsen the condition of the economy? Why has the political leadership of the country, which needs an improvement in national economic efficiency, conceptualized the Set of Measures in a way that is at odds with this goal? It has a profound logic. The degree of centralization and decentralization of economic management is directly related to the extent of centralized political power. After 10 years the goals of the political leadership of the country have not become the goals of a majority of the population. The goals have remained indifferent to the people's needs. The CPCZ leadership does not believe any more that it will be able to win the majority over to these goals in the near future. It has also made peace with the awareness that it will not eliminate the current economic difficulties in coming years and it is striving only to keep them from becoming too serious. Therefore it must proceed with the centralization policy, and must even tighten it if it wants to maintain power even in a situation where the unrest of the population will become more profound with the progressing economic stagnation. Only in this way is it able--principally in accordance with its own political interests--to have at its disposal a majority of society's resources. Only in this way--as the sole employer in the nation--can it apply against its foes so quickly and so immediately resources as efficient as livelihood-related punishments, including loss of employment. This demonstrates that the center trusts only itself, and therefore wants to decide itself to as great an extent as possible.

It is therefore obvious that the main thing influencing the condition of our economy today, that which decides what it does, is neither the condition of the world market (though its influences are extremely strong), the amount of resources which it is possible to assign to economic development, nor the concrete form of individual instruments of the economic mechanism. The fundamental factor is the discrepancy between the policy of the past decade and the relationship of the citizens to it, that is the whole condition of our society, which does not provide sufficiently significant social and political motivation for economic activity, for good work, and for a desire to work. Until the CPCZ leadership undertakes steps to positively overcome this society-wide crisis it will not be possible to solve even the economic problems which are only its consequence.

I do not think that the Set of Measures will fulfill the expectations which are being placed on it. Is it therefore unnecessary? Certainly not! The fact that it was necessary to move to alter the economic mechanism clearly shows that nothing presented as eternal, unchanging and perfect is necessarily any of these things, and that if there are sufficiently great economic and social forces pushing for changes, then changes will come--even in Czechoslovakia.

Prague, April 1980

9276
CSO: 2400

INTERFLUG DIRECTOR CITES GROWTH IN AIR TRANSPORTATION

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 22, 1980 signed to press 27 May 80 p 8

[Article by Maj Gen Klaus Henkes, deputy minister for transportation and INTERFLUG general director: "Twenty-Five Years for INTERFLUG"; Accomplished and Recognized Partner in World Air Traffic"]

[Text] Thirty-five years after the liberation from fascism, the GDR's civil aviation is also celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary. Within the unified GDR transportation system, the first socialist German air transport administration started operations on 1 July 1955.

In preparation for this, experts from Aeroflot had been fraternally assisting those who were engaged in developing GDR civil aviation. The USSR's generous help made it possible to create a national air traffic system within a relatively short time, to ensure the initiation of scheduled flying, the construction of GDR airports and civil air traffic control, to provide the technological prerequisites and to train the cadre.

The first official takeoff of a transport aircraft in our country occurred on 16 September 1955. On board was a governmental delegation which flew to Moscow to sign the treaty between the GDR and the USSR. To the young GDR aviators this was both a symbol and an honor; their first flight served to reinforce and further enhance German-Soviet relations. The Berlin-Moscow route, known as "Friendship Flight," has, since that first flight, remained an example for GDR civil aviation.

From this successful starting-point INTERFLUG has during the past 25 years developed at a steadily increasing rate and has continued to broaden its performance capability.

Today's INTERFLUG has five departments: passenger traffic, agricultural flying, aerial photography, airports and air traffic control. GDR air traffic policy emphasizes fulfilling transport and movement requirements to the socialist fraternal countries.

Passenger Flights on Four Continents

International airline traffic started on 4 February 1956 between Berlin and Warsaw. The international route system was developed according to plan in cooperation with the socialist airlines. Today there are flight connections not only with almost all capitals of socialist countries, but also from the Berlin-Schoenefeld, Dresden and Leipzig airports to the airports of cities of European socialist states which generate heavy passenger transport requirements, e.g. Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Varna, Zagreb and Bratislava.

But cooperation among fraternal socialist countries is not confined solely to international air traffic. Characteristic for joint endeavors for the benefit of socialist air traffic are exchanges of information and close collaboration based on special agreements, such as the "Berlin Agreement" on the subject of air traffic or the "Bucarest Agreement" concerning agricultural flying.

The work of the CEMA Standing Commission on Civil Aviation is of special importance for the further development of air traffic in the community of states. Imperialist intrigues against worldwide recognition of the GDR were directed also against our republic's air traffic. But the initiation of regular flight connections to a nonsocialist country on 29 May 1964 from Berlin to Nicosia proved that historical progress will not be denied.

The INTERFLUG route system was thereafter expanded to include Near and Middle East countries, Africa, Asia and European capitalist countries.

During the 25 years of its existence, INTERFLUG has through its performance developed into an internationally recognized and respected partner of many airlines and has gained the trust of many millions of air passengers. Today, INTERFLUG has a route system of about 125,000 km which includes 49 cities in 36 countries on four continents. By accumulating a total of 1.85 billion passenger kilometers (about 12 times the median distance between Earth and the Sun), about 1.25 million passengers were transported during 1979. In addition, extensive charter flight service was provided to about 250 cities in over 100 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, North, Central and South America.

Transport is provided to party and governmental delegations, tourist groups, sports enthusiasts, fishing vessel crews, orchestras and theater companies, and, increasingly, air freight. Of great importance are the numerous humanitarian flights made by INTERFLUG (providing aid to victims of natural disasters) and those made in behalf of international support to developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Material contributions by the workers of our republic are rushed to those in need of aid by INTERFLUG aircraft in minimum time and therefore most effectively. Seriously injured patients are frequently transported on the return flights for treatment in GDR hospitals.

Pioneer Work in Flying Crane and External Load Carrying

INTERFLUG aircraft have also been engaged since 1957 in socialist agricultural and forestry management in airdrops of chemicals. More than 200 agricultural aircraft and helicopters were flown from more than 1,000 auxiliary airstrips. With the assistance of Soviet aviators, they treated a total of about 4.2 million hectares of agricultural and forest land. Agricultural flying is employed primarily in those tasks which can only be accomplished with the use of aircraft or where aircraft is more effective than ground equipment. This is particularly true for spreading nitrogen fertilizers in wheat fields, fighting leaf rot in potato crops, fighting insects, seeding winter wheat and hay production on the slopes of our republic's medium-altitude mountains.

INTERFLUG's Aerial Photography Department, in existence since 1978, produces aerial photographs with the Zeiss MKF-6M Multispectral Camera and executes survey flights for geodetic, geologic and cartographic purposes; air ambulance and rescue flights, sports reporting and many other special purpose flights.

Since 1959, members of the Industrial Flight Squadron have done pioneering work in helicopter crane and exterior load transport work. The crews are experts in precision work required for industrial constrution or dismantling, erection of buildings, in the installation of high tension lines, in railroad control construction, in coastal protection activities, etc. The Aerial Photography department is continuously growing in importance as a factor for producing greater efficiency in significant branches of our economy.

The main mission of the Airports Department is the efficient handling of passengers, baggage, freight, mail and aircraft belonging to all airlines participating in GDR air traffic. The Berlin-Schoenefeld airport for example accommodates 16 foreign scheduled air carriers and aircraft belonging to many charter flight companies in addition.

The Dresden, Leipzig and Erfurt airports are especially used for tourist travel requirements from the southern part of the GDR to the international vacation centers. During 1979, GDR airports processed about 2.35 million passengers and 41,795 aircraft. The Airports Department fulfills a heavy responsibility in providing INTERFLUG with maintenance and additional expansion of construction and ground support facilities.

INTERFLUG's Air Traffic Control Department is responsible for air and safety control of civil aviation on the GDR's air lanes and in their takeoffs and landings at airports. During 1979, civil air controllers directed more than 290,000 air movements within the air lanes and more than 3.8 million teletype messages were transmitted on behalf of air traffic. Part of the CEMA Complex Program provides for automation of the GDR air traffic control system. In cooperation with our Soviet and Polish comrades,

excellent results were obtained. Today's INTERFLUG capabilities would be unthinkable without the excellent and resourceful efforts of all the airline's employees. Excellent performance by the air crews, extension of maximum operating limits of the Z-37 agricultural airplanes from 3,000 to 6,600 flying hours, the short lead time operational availability of the MKF-6M, the scientific contributions leading to air traffic control automation, the rapid acceleration in building volume capability, the results achieved in the MMM (Fair of the Masters of Tomorrow) and in the increase in effectiveness--all these are cited here as examples of excellent performance along with the devotion to their mission on the part of all employees. On the eve of 1 May 1980, the leadership of the party and the nation honored the efforts of these employees by awarding the Order of Karl Marx to INTERFLUG.

This high honor also constitutes for all INTERFLUG employees a responsibility to exert their maximum efforts in the socialist competition to satisfy economic requirements by observing maximum safety, steadiness, punctuality and conservation of financial resources. Further, they must maintain the highest standards in the processing and care of passengers, air freight and aircraft.

9273
CSO: 2300

BRIEFS

GDR SUBCHASER IN BALTIC--An East German frigate of a hitherto unknown class has been seen in the western part of the Baltic. It is a ship of about 1,200 tons, very like the new Danish corvettes of the Niels Juel class. The ship seems to be designed for combating submarines. When the frigate was sighted a few days ago it was flying the East German state flag and not the GDR's naval flag. It is thought therefore that it was on trials from the shipyard where it was built, before being handed over to the East German Navy. The ship has caused considerable interest within the Danish defense forces. The building of such antisubmarine ships has been connected with assumptions that the Warsaw Pact is in the process of moving its defense of the Baltic forward to the Skagerak and the North Sea. The first sign of this was--apart from increased activities in Danish waters in recent months--the maneuvers a combined Russian-Polish-East German squadron held in the North Sea. It was, as BERLINGSKE TIDENDE reported at the time, the first time such a combined force had operated outside of the Baltic. [Text] [LD231329 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Jul 80 p 7]

CSO: 3106

ROME DAILY INTERVIEWS KURON ON CURRENT WORK STOPPAGES, UNREST

LD281051 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 20-21 Jul 80 p IV, "Afghanistan File" Section

[Interview with Jacek Kuron, Polish oppositionist, by Annamaria Kozarzeski Bigazzi: "Polish Workers' Protest in Eighties is Nonviolent Struggle"--undated]

[Text] Warsaw--The work stoppages and discussions between worker delegations and factory managers have taken not only the Polish authorities but even the dissidents themselves by surprise. We sought an opinion on the difference between the current workers' protest and the ones in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976 from Jacek Kuron, who not only witnessed but also participated in all those previous events. Formerly a Communist youth exponent, after 1968 Kuron became one of the leaders of the Polish opposition and was one of the founders of the Social Self-Defense Committee "KOR". This opposition political activity has cost Kuron 6 years' imprisonment.

[Question] What difference is there between what is happening in Poland today and the previous revolts?

[Answer] This question refers to different social situations and demands a strict separation between what happened in 1956 and the subsequent occasions. There is, however, a similarity between what is happening now and what happened in 1976 and 1970. Indeed, there are two points that can be considered shared. In 1956, on the other hand, the Poznan uprisings took place at a time of profound crisis in the government and under different circumstances from the ideological viewpoint. Indeed, in my opinion, at that time the Party machinery had some grassroots supporters who believed to an extent in the ideals that it propagated. The worker's 1956 uprising in Poznan against the workers' government was a kind of shock for the machinery. The situation in 1956 was so different that it would require a separate analysis. I would, therefore, rather limit my reply to 1970, 1976 and the present situation.

[Question] What is the basic difference?

[Answer] The 1970 events took place following the 1968 experience, when all attempts at political action by the intelligentsia had been crushed.

The intelligentsia was shaken, afraid and to some extent fragmented. Added to the constant factor of the absence of social organization, the absence of any information other than the central source, there was the fact that every attempt at independent thought manifested by the intelligentsia was crushed. Furthermore, the government was aware of its enormous power and capabilities.

In 1976 the government already knew that it was not as powerful as before, but it still felt fairly strong and, furthermore, there was no information other than the central source. Now, however, the government knows quite definitely that it has no chance. This is the first point.

Second, there already exists an organized political opposition. There is, therefore, organized opposition, there are independent means, there is a separate source of information from the central one and we can witness the beginning of an aware workers' movement. However weak it may be, in its own way there is already an awareness that this movement exists. And this is due partly to the continuous action and influence of our clandestine magazine ROBOTNIK, which has reached a circulation of 30,000 and which is distributed regularly. This is a very important aspect.

Another equally important element concerns another kind of consideration: such a profound economic crisis and such a great depletion of resources did not exist in 1970 or 1976. Indeed, in 1976 there was a moment when the economic crisis attenuated and the situation improved. Now it can only deteriorate because all the country's reserves have been exhausted. Nevertheless, you cannot approach 1970, 1976, what is happening now and 1956 as isolated events. It is undeniable that the major difference between this year and the previous years lies in the fact that those experiences have already taken place. Each successive event has enriched our previous experience. It can be said that what has happened now is based precisely on a number of previous experiences. Let us now try to sum up these factors. There is the economic crisis, the experience, the organized opposition and the more politicized and more aware workers' movement that is trying to organize and extend the initiative. Such factors have made the present events take the form they have. A situation has thus come about in which, on the one hand, there is the government, which is afraid of society, and on the other hand the workers, who to some extent have already learned how to act and behave. At present, there are two forces confronting each other. On the one hand, the government, which refuses a dialogue and is afraid, and on the other, the workers, who do not want to go into the streets.

On 3 July the KOR released a communique urging the workers not to go into the streets, not to resort to violence, to avoid any damage, and to act through the impertance of this communique. I do not know if it reached all the factories, but I do know that at the Ursus Tractor Plant, where the organization was best, the workers did receive it. This communique, however, is the continuation of our policy and of the lengthy action which has been going on for 4 years now. In the final analysis, throughout these years we have repeated the slogan: Do not set fire to party premises, do not wreck the factories. I believe this has some importance.

I also believe that one must not underestimate another aspect. In my opinion, everything that has happened during the Polish experience--the firing of officers, street demonstrations, the wrecking of warehouses, the interruption of rail services and so forth--has been a form of communication; price increases were a signal to begin the strike. And so it has remained. But then the others had to be told that the strike was on. In a situation in which information is completely monopolized by the State and in which, during the strikes, the television service announces that a flower show has been held in Poznan, society and the rest must be told that the strike has been held. This is why people go into the streets and commit arson and all the other violent acts.

Now the situation is different: We are on the scene and can spread this information, which thus reaches broad strata of society. We proceeded from the principle of supplying information only to the factories in which we had direct contact with the strikers. I, therefore, believe that, overall, strikes took place at over 30--perhaps 50 or at the most 60--factories! I do not believe these figures are exaggerated.

I have said that the government's hands are tied from the psychological viewpoint, but how do I view the situation? This wave of strikes must pass. All the demands will be met to a greater or lesser extent, everyone will get his money, but the workers will have the realization that you can strike and that you can obtain something by striking. In some factories a good level of organization will be achieved and we will seek to publicize this. What will happen next? Very soon the time will come when inflation will swallow up all the pay increases and the people will realize that they no longer have that money. Not to mention the fact that there are some social categories that cannot strike--pensioners, civil servants, and so forth.

In our social structure this is very important for a worker's family because when the father is retired and the daughter is a civil servant, the family budget is based mainly on the worker's income. Therefore, in my opinion the workers will realize that they no longer have that money and that will greatly increase the impetus to strike. I believe that the government will provide the direct stimulus because it will want to carry out restructuring in the factories. But even if it does not, the exacerbation of this struggle through the strikes will be considerable because you must bear in mind that the government has no more funds to increase salaries and, therefore, in my opinion, the only solution lies in the workers' organization. This can change everything fundamentally. If the workers organize they can, through their representatives, exert pressure on economic reform, and if a dialogue can be held with these representatives it will be possible to reach a situation in which the government is capable of governing. This is the main issue. We repeated again in our latest communique that the workers' demands must include the demand for an economic program, economic reform, because this is the only solution, for this government too. In the present political situation, even though we are in favor of the parliamentary system, independence, and so forth, we do not want to overthrow this government.

That this is the only solution is confirmed by the fact that now that we are on the scene and information is more widespread, people are no longer going onto the streets and committing arson. This confirms that we must organize within the context of society. Naturally our information depends on the information we receive from the workers, on the cooperation among us, and this is in itself an example of an organization which has enabled all the present events to take place in a much more peaceful and much less violent way. This is only the beginning: this is what I am counting on and I believe that it can be achieved. This is the hope and also the only chance. I do not know whether it is a big one, but I hope so. Because if it fails, the result could be a disaster.

CSO: 3104

DISSIDENT PUBLICATIONS CITED ON ELECTION FALSIFICATIONS

London DZIENNIK POLSKI in Polish 12 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by Andrzej J. Chilecki: "Caught in the Act"]

[Text] If I refer here to the PRL elections, I am not doing so because this event has any particular significance. On the contrary. These elections were just another staged event, one of many such events, and everybody forgot all about them the next day. Indeed, even the propaganda campaign surrounding this show was uninspired, and access to the meetings with candidates was strictly controlled for fear that embarrassing questions might be asked. As everyone knows, only the members of the democratic opposition were tracked down and locked up without mercy. To be fair, we should also note that, at least in the larger cities, anyone who did not choose to vote was not visited at home by a so-called "social aktiv" urging them to "carry out their civic duty," a practice which was part of the regular electoral routine during the days of Stalin and Bierut. The only reason this regime-inspired flimflam is worth talking about is that this time the dirty tricks were especially shameless and blatant. For years now people in Poland have gotten used to the idea that the very word "elections" no longer has any meaning. How could there be any such thing as an election with only one slate of candidates! But this time the government did not even care whether the final vote count appeared to be plausible, And, in fact, the opposition press recently obtained evidence to prove this.

People gathered this evidence on their own initiative and often in highly ingenious and cunning ways. One recent arrival from Poland told me about a good idea his friend had. This friend lived in a big city in a ground-floor apartment, across the street from a school which served as an election commission polling place. He did not have any trouble finding out how many registered voters there were in this precinct; these figures are a matter of public record. On election day he spent the whole day from morning on looking out the window from behind the curtains with notepad and pencil in hand; at mealtimes he was relieved by his wife and daughter. He counted the number of people entering the polling station, and whenever he had any doubts he would decide in favor of the opposing side, that is, he would count the people going into the building as registered

voters. Late that evening he diligently tallied up the marks he had made on his notepad. There was no doubt about it. The number of registered voters who actually voted could not have been more than 70 percent. Seventy percent of the registered voters in this precinct did come to cast ballots. But how many of these people, taking advantage of their right to cast ballots in curtained voting booths, crossed out the names of one, several or all of the candidates listed on the ballot sheet? By way of comparison, answers to this question are provided by that enterprising and always well-informed journal BIULETYN INFORMACYJNY (No 2/36, March-April 1980) which is closely tied to the KSS-KOR: "Saska Kepa: 20-percent absentee rate; 15 percent of those who voted cast secret ballots. Pragaur: slightly more than 70 percent of the registered voters actually voted, and of these 20 percent crossed out candidates' names." And so everyone agrees, quite obviously, notwithstanding the official election results, according to which, as everyone knows, the government's share of the vote was not less than 99-97 percent (with very few exceptions).

And how were these results "achieved?" On this score too the BIULETYN INFORMACYJNY has provided us with a number of interesting figures: "The Tyniecka Street polling station(Upper Mokotow precinct). This precinct has 2,450 registered voters. By 2000 hours 2,030 of the registered voters had voted, i.e., 83 percent. After sending in its report, the election commission was informed by its superiors that this precinct has only 2,050 registered voters. Consequently, it was shown that 99 percent of the registered voters had in fact voted." This juggling of figures was repeated in other election return reports as well. One of these reports quotes a statement made to the so-called election commission "insiders" at the meeting of a party ward committee: "We aren't going to worry about the election results, since we have our own people all over the place.... We have nobody to answer to but ourselves here, and we know how to get what we want." The various polling stations received a steady stream of telephoned instructions which "revised" the figures on registered voters and ordered the casting of ballots on which none of the candidates' names had been crossed out. "The real world is gradually being transformed into an ideal world...," obviously meaning the regime's idea of an ideal world. Everything is subject to manipulation, and the only figures that will be reported are those that the authorities want to report. The BIULETYN should be given credit for the fact that it was able to put together such an extensive and convincing report. Luckily, the evidence of this fraud could not be covered up completely. The perpetrators of the fraud were forced to rely on the cooperation of "insiders," who later told the BIULETYN all about their experiences.

(The dissident publication ROBOTNIK (No 46/1980)also published an article dealing with the falsified election returns: "According to several reports which we have received from election commissions in Warsaw and Olsztyn, the voter participation figures were inflated in the evening by telephoned instructions from party ward headquarters, thereby boosting the actual

percentage of participating voters from 62-80 percent to over 95 percent; many voters ripped up their ballots or put sugar ration coupons and leaflets [entitled, e.g.,: "Wybory? Zostan w domu! Brezniew glosuje dla ciebie" ("Elections? Stay home! Breshnev Is Voting in Your Place")] into the ballot boxes, and some also added the initials W.W. (wolne wybory [free elections]) or their own political comments to their ballots. At some polling stations there were no booths. The practice of casting ballots for absent voters was followed sporadically in the cities and rather generally in rural areas." In GLOS (No 3-4/1980) Antoni Macierewicz furnished the following additional information: "Nobody knows the actual results of the election, not even the members of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo, since the results were tampered with all the way down at the district election commission level. Reports on the number of voters who actually cast ballots that we have received from several district election commissions show the following results: Warsaw--45%, 62%, 67%, 71%, 82%, 83%, 83%; Warsaw suburbs--55%, 62%; Wroclaw--25% (university housing residents); Olsztyn--62%; Lubiin--73%.)

And as for those who did vote, what were their reasons for doing so? On this score too the BIULETYN collected some persuasive data, which it related in the form of an abbreviated opinion survey:

"A university student: 'I'm going to apply for a passport in May....'

"High school student: 'I didn't want to go, but this is my graduation year. And from morning on my mother kept bugging me by asking: "What would you rather do: enter the university or join the army?" At 3 o'clock I gave in and went. But I crossed out everybody's name on the ballot.'

"The wife of a retired scientist: 'My husband has had a second heart attack and we have applied for a place for him in a convalescent home.'

"A retired woman venting her rage in a grocery store: 'I voted, I voted! I'm trying to get a place in a retirement home, what else could I do! I didn't want them to find me a week later like they did this other woman up on the third floor....'"

And so on and so forth. And so everyone can plainly see what is really going on here. And despite the omniscience of the omnipresent pressure applied by the authorities, despite their everyday extortionist practices, it is obvious that at least 20 percent of all Poles did not vote and that at least another 20 percent crossed off the names of candidates listed on the ballots, often going so far as to cross off the entire slate.

But everybody knows that the official reports tell us that this time around the level of voter participation in the elections and the "show of support for the candidates of the Unity Front" broke all the always exaggerated records. As if it were out of the question to show just a little bit of respect for the facts or to falsify the election returns in

a more plausible manner! Nevertheless, it is in fact true that this time public opinion made itself felt as never before. There was enough strong indications to show that our weary and embittered public would abstain from participating in these sham elections on a heretofore unprecedented scale. But this did not bother the propagandists in the least.

The zealousness with which this government, a government which was unlawfully imposed on the Polish nation, is always striving to give itself an aura of legitimacy is really amazing. It would seem that it should be able to cast aside all these fig leaves once and for all and do what it wants--i.e., to single out whomever it does not like, make whatever decisions it wants, and reward and punish people at its own discretion. But no! It is constantly going to great lengths to prove that its elections are "free," that its institutions are "democratic," that its judiciary is "independent," that its debates are a forum for "all the people," and so on. So the regime has its traditions which it must live up to. Even so, during the years when the Stalinist terror was at its peak in the Soviet Union, at a time when people were being liquidated on a massive scale and when anybody's head could go on the block at any moment, the regime still complied with the principles which held that victims had to "confess" to crimes they did not commit and organized "court trials," even though they may have lasted for only 3 minutes. And again the question comes to mind: What for? Yet the fact remains that it is an inherent characteristic of this system that it always portrays itself as being something which it is not and that it always pretends to be something which it is not. Otherwise it could not survive.

And so in fact the government staged some show elections, for the umpteenth time. To be sure, it was caught redhanded in the act of falsifying the results of these elections. And this was not the first time it got caught. Of course, this time too it is pretending nothing happened and that the people have demonstrated their "support" for the government. If we live long enough to witness the holding of real elections in Poland, we will then see things in black and white for real without having to pretend this is the way it really is.

In the meantime the following joke is making the rounds in Poland:

"What is different about the Council of Ministers building since Comrade Edward Babiuch took office as premier? It is 99.5 percent certain that the urinals have been lowered 20 centimeters...."

11813
CSO: 2600

'PROLETARIAN' LIFESTILY OF PZPR LEADERS DESCRIBED

London DZIENNIK POLSKI in Polish 7 Jul 80 p 4

[Text] Difficult living conditions, standing in lines or packing into crowded apartments are not felt by a sizable group of people in Poland. They are the dignitaries of various categories--from the highest state or party leaders down to the voivodship and managerial levels (and in Poland managers of different ranks are counted in tens of thousands). The privileges for the "new class" not only evoke suppressed bitterness among the public, but also burden it with high costs, the amount of which is a state secret.

The party "owners of the People's Poland" on different occasions, readily underscore their allegiance to Lenin's principles. They never, however, mention one of them, namely his motto "part-maximum." Lenin demanded that the pay of the full-time employees of the Bolshevik Party could not surpass a specified amount which was equivalent to the workers' pay. Under Gierek, no one in Poland dares remind one of these Leninist instructions.

Vacations and work leaves which are just coming, provide an opportunity to take a look at the "workers' vacations" of the dignitaries. For example, let's look at the "Granit" rest-home in Szklarska Poreba that is reserved primarily for the use of the high officials of the party apparatus. The construction of this nine-story "little house" was started 5 years ago. It was placed on a slope of a high mountain and was built in terraces. The first work on the construction, dislodging of rocks with explosives, was done by the army (without pay, of course).

The construction was costly and carried out with luxurious precision. Concrete shelters were built deep in the rocks and the ground, and a heated swimming pool was also placed underground. This rest palace has the most elegant interior which was, in considerable part, equipped with imports, that is to say, it was paid for by the state with hard currency. The "Granit" has been thoughtfully provided with facilities for pleasant passage of time. It has its own movie, cafe, recreation rooms, bowling alley, etc.

Semiofficial insiders admit that the cost of this rest-home amounted to 320 million zlotys, but in fact it was much higher. The neighboring population does not call it "Granit," but named it "Gierek's place" ("gierkowka"). This is not the only "gierkowka." Similar ones stand, or are being built in Maly Cichy near Zakopane, in Bieszczady and the the Swietokrzyskie Mountains and by the sea, not counting several others which have been in existence already for a long time in Mazury or in the hunting regions of the Rzeszow Voivodship. Needless to say, the cost of staying in these homes is nominal.

They are public property (but not accessible to the public). There are also the private properties of individual dignitaries, namely villas and "dachas" in the Warsaw region and in the popular Mazury. A vivid example of this is Edward Gierek's villa-palace in Klarysewo near Warsaw that we have already mentioned in the DZIENNIK some time ago. As is presently known, tens of millions of zlotys went for its construction. A considerable share of this amount was in hard currency, because many of the building components as well as interior facilities (including marble and bronze) were brought in from abroad.

This pursuit of the private interests at the cost of the state treasury dates back to the time when Gierek took power. During the time of Bierut, there also were luxury privileges (e.g., stores "behind yellow curtains"), but not to such a great extent, that were available only to a relatively small circle of party leadership. Gomulka curtailed the attempts to increase the privileges and made them available to a wider group. In his domain in Slask, Gierek was already used to personal luxury, so he expanded the range of material benefits for the party and government elite.

It was Gierek who in October 1972 put through a decree (ratified immediately by the Sejm) giving the PZPR functionaries retirement benefits from the state treasury. Not everyone remembers this today, but it was, after all, a public scandal. In addition, the dignitaries from the two other parties (ZSL and SD) cannot avail themselves of these retirement pensions.

The first secretary of PZPR (in the future also Gierek) has the highest state retirement pension--the same as only the Council of State chairman and the prime minister receive. The members of the Politburo have a right to the same pensions as the Sejm marshal, deputy prime ministers and the Council of State deputy chairmen. The Central Committee secretaries receive the same pensions as the ministers, president of the Polish Academy of Science and the Supreme Court president.

The table of pensions of the lower party ranks is similarly alined with the high functionaries of the state apparatus. The comrades on all the levels of the PZPR hierarchy have it good.

CSO: 2600

CEAUSESCU RECEIVES LEADER OF U.S. FOUNDATION

AU051828 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1800 GMT 5 Aug 80

[Text] Bucharest, 5 Aug (AGERPRES)--On August 5 Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu was called on, at Neptun, by Arthur Schneier, president of the U.S. foundation "Appeal to Consciousness," who now visits Romania.

Warmly thanking President Nicolae Ceausescu for the interview granted him, for the invitation he received to visit Romania and to get in touch with personalities of the Romanian political life, the guest highly assessed the Romanian foreign policy, the prodigious activity dedicated by the Romanian head of state to the consolidation of international peace and security, to strengthening detente and collaboration among all the peoples.

During the interview the sides have tackled international topical aspects, considering the present situation in the world to make necessary for all the states, for the governmental and nongovernmental organizations to intensify efforts in view of resuming and furthering the policy of detente, peace, collaboration and respect for the national independence, of finding exclusively political, negotiated solutions to all litigious matters, of stopping the arms race, of passing on to concrete disarmament measures, nuclear disarmament measures first of all, of liquidating underdevelopment and setting in a new international economic order.

During the interview an important place was held by talks on the ways conducive to a global settlement of the Middle East conflict, ways that should result in a lasting just peace, grounded on the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied after the 1967 war, in solving the question of the Palestinian people, the foundation of an independent Palestinian state included, in guaranteed integrity of the independence and sovereignty of all the states in the region.

During the talks the sides also brought to the fore the contribution the world public opinion, the international nongovernmental organizations

should play in the promotion of understanding and collaboration, in strengthening detente and peace the world over.

The interview passed in a cordial atmosphere.

Attending was Stefan Andrei, minister of foreign affairs.

Present was Moses Rosen, chief rabbi of the Mosaic Cult.

CSO: 2020

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY OF SCHOOL OFFICIAL CONDEMNED

Bucharest MUNCA DE PARTID in Romanian Jul 80 p 94

[Article: "Mystical Customs Practiced by Those Who Should Combat Them"]

[Text] Not long ago, our editorial staff received a letter from Cuca Commune, Arges County, informing us that Gheorghe Radau, coordinating director of schools for the commune, had his child baptized according to all the religious canons. An investigation confirmed this.

One cannot say that the coordinating director of schools in Cuca does not know that mystical practices are in total contradiction with his position as a Communist, as a consistent fighter for the application of the policy of the party, for the promotion of its revolutionary outlook! In an earlier letter sent by him to our editorial staff, reporting some violations committed by some cadres in leadership positions in the commune, he seemed to be astonished that one of these people would organize a christening ceremony, writing:" I knew that persons in positions of leadership were prohibited from organizing such events." But, what is forbidden to others is permitted for me. What a curious viewpoint!

In addition, the signer of the letter, Gh. Serban (I") also has the same distorted view of the obligations of party members. He denounces Gh. Radau for having baptized the child and, at the same time, he organizes wedding ceremonies with priests and gifts for his sons. According to what ethical norm do these two party members demand from others that which they do not demand from themselves?

The commune party committee is also at fault in this situation. Instead of taking a stand in regard to such retrograde manifestations, it acquiesces in them and tolerates them. For example, when C. Dumitrache, party organizer and chairman of the combined agro-industrial council in Vedea, the behest of the county party committee, informed the secretary and the deputy secretaries of the committee in regard to the deeds of Gh. R., the former confined themselves merely to making a statement, without taking any measures, without condemning the two-faced attitude of Radau. It is time for the commune committee to learn all possible lessons from such situations and to intervene firmly for the permanent instilling of the principles of socialist ethics, for the firm mastery of the materialist-scientific concept of the world and society by all party members, by the broad masses of workers in Cuca Commune.

CSO: 2700

BRIEFS

AL-SADAT MESSAGE TO CEAUSESCU--To His Excellency Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania: I was deeply moved by the cordial congratulations and friendly wishes you kindly extended to me on the 23 July celebration. I take this opportunity to extend best wishes for health to you and to express the desire that relations of friendship and cooperation between our two peoples increasingly consolidate. With highest consideration, [Signed] Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat. [Text] [AU311356 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 30 Jul 80 p 5 AU]

CSO: 2700

ROLE, FUNCTION OF THE LCY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Belgrade SOCIJALIZAM in Serbo-Croatian No 2, Feb 80 pp 59-66

[Article by Vucina Vasovic: "The League of Communists in the Political System of Socialist Self-Management"]

[Excerpt] General Conditions and Functions of the League of Communists

We have already said that the character of the League of Communists will depend not only on its projections, but also on the real conditions in which it is operating. The nature of those conditions is not, of course, something that is frozen hard, but something that can change and, accordingly, something that can and should be influenced. At this point we should on the one hand bear in mind a number of favorable circumstances related to almost the entire effort to develop society more rapidly along the lines of self-management and many real and constructive achievements of self-management, and on the other certain limiting factors. Among these latter we can stress the relatively restrictive economic conditions, which objectively hold back the desired pace of development. We should, of course, also mention here the remnants of the old relations, which are showing a tough persistence and are pulling toward a restoration of the old state of affairs. Along with these factors, we should also take into account international circumstances and the fact of our geographic position at the crossroads of different ideological systems, systems which are also showing strong tendencies toward expansion. Nor should we pay any the less attention to the more or less general tendency of the present-day political world which we have already mentioned and which is expressed in a steady and sure growth of administration, with potential bureaucratic attributes and quite considerable political aspirations. Also, the growth of technocracy and of its aspirations does not provide much basis for the belief that the dilemma between the "red" or the "expert," which we have already noted, is an altogether nonsensical and malicious improvisation. To all this we should also add the basically rather possessive side of human nature, which is still essentially unchanged and which--today, it seems, more obviously than ever before--is not exclusively the fruit of the class societies which have existed up to now or of a mindlessly and ignorantly structured political system, as some utopians believed, but is in a certain sense a broader

attribute which man will have to offset with certain other of his attributes and capabilities, and also by his social system, at least for the foreseeable future. Here we should also bear in mind the underdeveloped consciousness and market relations and conditions, however offset they might be by other mechanisms, which develop or perpetuate the acquisitive side of human behavior. In the context of general circumstances such as these it would be an illusion to expect the self-generated development of socialist self-management as a spontaneous movement of the working people or the working class. The nature of these conditions, which gives rise to a number of contradictions not only in society, but even within the working class itself, creates the need for the existence and activity of the League of Communists as a vanguard organization. Moreover, all these dangers and possible "traps" we have mentioned confirm this determination, but they also require that the leading role of the League of Communists, which is set forth in the constitution and program or bylaws, be postulated and performed in the appropriate way. It should be said that the leading role of the League of Communists, which is unified in terms of ideology and aims, is actually a rather complicated one and that it is not always a simple matter to ascertain all the elements contained in this leading "syndrome." Without entering very deeply into the content or citing all the aspects or functions making up that overall role, we will mention here only some of the more important ones.

First of all, it seems worthwhile to emphasize the guiding function of the League of Communists, which is related to clear ideological commitments, and then its integrative function in both the horizontal and vertical direction, its function of educating and socializing personnel, its mobilizing function, its democratizing function and its participatory function.

There are also certain remarks which we must immediately make here. First, most of these functions are not performed by the League of Communists alone, but rather it shares them or performs them together with other entities. Second, a number of these functions overlap, and it is difficult to separate or distinguish them altogether clearly. Third, and this has particular importance for us, we cannot expect that these functions are always performed in equal degree or that their synchronization, proportioning and combination are regarded as among the most important issues.

In their total effect, purport, result and character, and especially because of the manner in which they are performed, these functions constitute or represent that essential characteristic that distinguishes the League of Communists from other parties old and new, western or eastern. They help to make the League of Communists a powerful factor-instrument for the development of socialism and for accomplishment of that development through a democratic process of decisionmaking. For this to be the case, the League of Communists must conduct and develop its activity mostly in the decisionmaking processes of self-management. This orientation and method of operation of the League of Communists, along with the other conditions, of course, brings about an almost radical change in certain features of the

overall political system as well as in the position and role of its individual elements.

As a factor in developing social consciousness and as an internal force in self-management, the League of Communists cannot stand like some external factor and body of government and send out directives to the bodies of the political or delegate system where self-management decisionmaking is done. It is within the democratic delegate bodies, together with self-management and all the socialist forces, in a responsible democratic struggle of opinions and in a free posing of alternatives that the League of Communists should fight for affirmation of its policy and its positions.* "Were the League of Communists to remain outside that self-management structure, then there would be a danger of that structure being taken over to some extent by other tendencies or even by other political factors with the aim of again displacing the League of Communists from the system, as was the tendency of petty bourgeois liberalism and the advocates of party-political pluralism, or the League of Communists itself might be compelled to wheel around once again and impose decisions from above."**

Under these conditions other sociopolitical organizations can also be more independent in their activity and more responsible to their membership. The League of Communists is also active within them through the force of its arguments and as a factor for the further development of self-management and for the socialist content of self-management decisionmaking. In this way the delegate system and sociopolitical organizations become that real terrain on which the League of Communists establishes constant communication with its class and with the broadest strata of the population. This is a condition and the manner of the LCY's freeing itself of sectarian activity and pressure, that is, of the temptation to be the executor of decisions by various small managerial groups or merely a mobilizer of the masses to carry out such decisions. In this way we arrive at a new historical situation in which the party which is the leading force in a society does not operate from positions of power, nor does it use conventional government and legal instruments as the primary levers in carrying out its policy.

Functions of the League of Communists and Possibilities of Their Performance

It is very important to the optimum and effective and practical functioning not only of the League of Communists, but indeed of the entire political system, to know the kind of mutual relationship these functions have to one another and the kind of relationship that exists between them and the general conditions on the one hand and between the functions and abilities of

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* E. Kardelj, "Pravci razvoja politickog sistema socijalistickog samoupravljanja" [Lines of Development of the Political System of Socialist Self-Management], Belgrade, 1977.

** Ibid.

the League of Communists to perform and embody them, or its overall political "carrying capacity," on the other. The former is important because it is sometimes impossible to perform all functions to the same degree, and the latter because in assigning sizes to the functions, consideration must also be given to ability and in general the possibilities of performing them. At certain times and in certain places the question is even raised of the compatibility of these functions, and reference is made to the importance or necessity of the existence, at least in reserve, of some kind of priority among them for the case when it is difficult to synchronize or balance them appropriately. Thus a foreign observer of our system, Berch, asks whether there isn't a certain contradiction between the leading role and the requirement that the League of Communists be a factor in democratization and operate through self-management structures and whether this will not result in some kind of "nonparty" system in which the party sits in ambush as a dominant though invisible spirit?* A misunderstanding might truly occur here if the new role is regarded solely as some kind of amorphous and insufficiently articulated activity, one which is manifested solely within the broader process of self-management decisionmaking, and not also as the activity of an independent political organization.

In the context of these general requirements and processes, two questions seem to be of particular interest today: "First, what is the relationship between the integrative and democratic or democratizing function, and second, what is the relation between the guiding and participating function?" On this occasion I will be touching upon these questions and posing them more than I will engage in a broad discussion of them.

As for the first question, we should immediately say that it has not received the serious attention it deserves in the theory of socialist self-management. It is quite clear that it is not always a simple matter to perform the integrative function because of a number of circumstances. Another reason why we cannot expect this is the fact that under the conditions of a broad pluralism of interests, the openness of society and the orientation of the League of Communists to operate in a new democratic way, and indeed in view of its numerical size, a number of contradictions arising today in society expand and enter even into the "body" of the League of Communists. What is more, it is not precluded that certain of the social contradictions that exist will be manifested still more drastically and sharply within the framework of the League of Communists. There are two particular reasons for this: first, because an organization which contains equality as one of its basic values in its ideology is becoming more sensitive to cases of inequality in its own ranks; second, because it is within the League of Communists that we find the strata and structures with the highest position in the social division of labor and also those who stand at the very foot of the social "ladder." Which raises the key question: To what extent does the social differentiation within the League of Communists, which incorporates quite a few divisions and contradictions of the

* E. G. Berch, "Yugoslavia: The Eleventh Congress, the Constitution and the Succession, Government and Opposition," winter 1979.

broader society, affect the ideology and unity of consciousness and action of the League of Communists, and what is to be the defense against the adverse consequences of its internal differentiation or diversification, which to some degree is necessary. It is likely that these circumstances, with traces on the state of awareness, result even in differences in certain commitments and give rise to the need for the integrative function to be performed in certain cases in optimum harmony with the democratic function.

It is interesting that in spite of this kind of openness which it has, the League of Communists constitutes the most integral part of our social structure and that the influence of stratum differences on the ideological commitments of members of the League of Communists is smaller than the impact of those differences on the ideological positions and commitments of those who are not members of the League of Communists. What are all the factors lying behind this phenomenon? We should say that the nature of these reasons varies, but those factors which are in line with the relevant democratic demand are convincingly predominant. Without claiming to enter into all the possible reasons in detail, we will cite only some of the more important ones. First, we should emphasize the more or less unified orientation of the members of the League of Communists with respect to the basic strategic goals, in particular the construction of a socialist and communist society. Second, ideological-political education and activity are more intensive in the League of Communists than in society at large. Third, the feeling of belonging and of relying on such a broad-based and important organization cannot but have a corresponding ideological and psychological effect. Fourth, democratic centralism as the principle governing the organization and activity of the League of Communists comprises the framework for the united activity of its members regardless of differences in individual views. Fifth, we should not, of course, overlook the rich revolutionary tradition of the League of Communists as well. It is not difficult to note that all these aspects and factors are in accord with the basic orientation of the League of Communists to be democratic in its own behavior in the process of the democratization of society.

At the same time, we might pose the question whether the League of Communists can perform its basic functions in such an effective way without certain other "supplemental" points of support which are not in absolutely every case built of very firm democratic "material"? If it is difficult to answer this question with a simple yes or no, it is not impossible to imagine that the performance of some functions would be more difficult without those points of support. It is also indispensable to the further and more rapid democratic development of a revolutionary vanguard organization to illuminate these points.

If we wanted to make an outline sketch of some of these "factors," then we could not fail to emphasize, perhaps even before all others, the phenomenon of the aggregation of functions in one part of the very inner core of the League of Communists. Certain research convincingly shows this with data

to the effect that all of 46 percent of the membership of the League of Communists had no positions, while at the same time 2 percent had 7 different official positions.* Thus it would be naive to believe that the aggregation of functions can be altogether eliminated in this phase of development. In the end this would not even be advisable. However, it does seem possible and necessary to reduce this phenomenon to the necessary minimum. Probably this is another direction in which implementation of the idea of collective work and leadership will have a constructive impact.

In addition, we should emphasize the fact of the relatively satisfactory status of a majority of the members of the League of Communists, as can be seen from certain figures that about 85 percent of its membership has earnings above the average. The composition of its membership with respect to qualifications, in which the share of semiskilled and unskilled workers is low, has much to do with this. This could act as a relatively integrative factor within the organization of the League of Communists, but it also could act as a factor impeding its integrative function in the broader dimensions of society or resulting in a certain collision between the integrative function so defined and the effort to have decisions made through broad participation of the working people and citizens. This is especially the case when specific decisions are being made which are most closely related to the question of distribution, and the League of Communists, as an integral part of the assembly structure, is a direct participant in this process. We will have something more to say about this later on.

Along with all this, another fact we cannot neglect is that members of the League of Communists cover almost all the more important executive functions at the higher levels of organization and in the more important centers of decisionmaking.** If we bear in mind the rather large influence of executive bodies and technical staff services in the process of decisionmaking, then this fact is important from the standpoint of the integrative role of the League of Communists. On the one hand it suggests a possible explanation as to why the phenomenon of the relatively great power of executive bodies is being overcome slowly in spite of the proclaimed principles. As we see, the "tenure" of executive positions by members of the League of Communists has contradictory attributes and effects and results from broader social and political causes. Performance of the integrative

* S. Stanic, "The League of Communists as a Cadre Organization or Mass Organization--Real or Imaginary Dilemma," symposium devoted to the League of Communists organized by the journal SOCIJALIZAM, Belgrade, 1977.

** Whereas about 75 percent of all the delegates of opstina assemblies in Serbia are members of the League of Communists, more than 97 percent of the members of executive bodies of those same assemblies are members of the League of Communists. At the higher levels the share of members of the League of Communists is still higher. As for the composition of those who hold the position of professional management officers in basic organizations of associated labor, the share of members of the League of Communists increased from 83 percent to more than 88 percent in 1977.

function, then, also necessitates certain "additional" reserves which need not conform in all respects with the democratization either of society or of the League of Communists. Since they cannot be eliminated without risking damage to effective performance of the integrative function, the whole point is how to optimally combine the integrative function and all its various dimensions and the democratic function of the League of Communists so that they complement one another.

To what limit these "additional" points of support can be tolerated without violating the democratic nature and democratizing function of the League of Communists remains an important question.

Another always acute problem of the workers' movement and of every worker party, including the League of Communists, is synchronization of the guiding and participating functions or the balancing of strategic relations between the remote goals and the current or more immediate goals. We have already said that the differences and indeed possible confrontations are greater concerning the issues of the particular stage or current or specific issues than concerning the strategic issues, under certain circumstances, of course, since the aims of the particular stage are related in a much more visible and direct way to the specific interests of individuals and groups. It is the choice of directions or of the order of steps in current policy and of specific priorities that generates the issues over which there is a certain separation of particular groups or strata, which otherwise might share the same strategic commitment. Since members of the League of Communists are in all managerial structures and in those places which are better situated from the material standpoint, even though membership in the League of Communists does not bring with it any sort of privileges, and since the League of Communists has become even a structural part of the assembly mechanism and of the process of current decisionmaking, this question arises: Won't it get into a situation of opting for those decisions which will be closer to the interest of those groups and strata which are better off, that is, closer to the relevant partial interests than to the strategic interest of the working class and of the majority in society? This certainly could happen in cases when a portion of the League of Communists, which has also become a portion of the managerial structure, is not prepared to stand erect and act from the level of the interests and requirements of the entire organization and the class with which it has its vital ties. Partial forms of decisionmaking, however necessary and unavoidable they might be, could at times constitute a favorable framework for adoption of positions of principle on the one hand and on the other and at the same time for participation in adopting decisions which protect partial interests, without sufficient acknowledgment of general interests. To some extent this can also explain why sometimes even in delegate assemblies, of which the delegation of the League of Communists is also a part, decisions are made which do not conform to the wishes and demands of the broader delegate base. Taking everything into consideration, incorporation of the League of Communists into the structure and process of current decisionmaking, aside from its constructive aspects, which we have not been discussing

here, does run the danger of its becoming absorbed and of losing itself in contradictions, and thereby the danger of pragmatization, which could objectively make it more difficult for it to successfully perform its guiding function. That is why neglect of the strategic orientation and of actions to achieve the long-range interests of the working class and becoming bound up in current demands and pressures inflict the same amount of damage on the movement and the vanguard role of the League of Communists as the lazy teleological-futuristic orientation, when optimum ways are not sought for translating goals into practice and when the "whirlpool" of concrete decisionmaking is not entered. It is self-evident that this cannot be achieved without experimentation and the risk of getting off course. It is not a question here of the League of Communists standing aloof from the process of decisionmaking and from the concrete dilemmas of life, but of the need for it to be involved in this process and at the same time retaining an adequate portion of forces or energy on the front of the basic historical and long-range interests of the working class and of socialist self-management. This leads us to the need for constant affirmation and development of the basic ideas of Marxism and of the basic Marxist orientation, which should stand as an inspiration even in practical behavior. We can, of course, hardly expect this front to be held unless the moral function of the League of Communists is developed. And that moral function can be performed only by people who sincerely believe in the goals of the League of Communists and who are prepared to bring their momentary and narrow interests into proper conformity with the overall interests of society and the working class or to subordinate them to the latter. That is why even today it is not an irrelevant question as to whether the League of Communists should continue to be a cadre party. For all its breadth and openness, it must also be a cadre organization to a large extent because of the nature of its tasks as a vanguard. At the same time, it must also exist and operate openly, democratically and publicly both as a part of the mechanism of self-management assemblies and also as an independent organization.

But it must be acknowledged that along with full devotion to strategic and moral values and assuming appropriate organizational adaptation of the League of Communists to its functions, solutions for a more lasting appropriate establishment of the proper relationship among the individual functions of the League of Communists, and indeed between the party and the class, cannot be sought solely within the framework of a party, nor even the League of Communists. The broader forms of self-management decisionmaking in which the working class will be able to directly express its interests and to fight for their realization also constitute the real barrier to a possible separation of the party from the class and a reliable way in which a vanguard organization can measure its true revolutionary nature and activity.

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DISCUSSION, CRITICISM OF YOUTH PRESS

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9, 10 Jul 80

[Article by Djoko Kesic: "The Youth Press Between Exaggeration and Tedium"]

[9 Jul 80, p 5]

[Text] Neither a Cactus Nor a Political Reservation

Borne along by their age and often by "leftwing" convictions, persuaded that they are the ones born to change this world, the young people in their newspapers are without inhibition, and also often without enough arguments and discretion, attacking and criticizing everything that in their opinion is debasing self-management socialism, declaring at the same time that the leadership groups of the youth organizations have become a bastion of bureaucratism and that they are neither prompt nor appropriate when they deal with the problems of the youth press and the university student press. And when they decide to show a concern, then this is usually "when the pumpkin bursts," that is, when there has already been some exaggeration. At these points their entire concern over a particular youth newspaper comes down to prohibiting an issue, hounding the author of the "compromising" article and the editor in chief, appointing a few new members to the publication board and holding a closed meeting.

And when the older comrades concern themselves with the problems of youth newspapers, their judgments range from well-intentioned suggestions to clear reproaches. Thus some will say that "the newspaper the boys put out is too messy," that "the kids are interested only in rock and roll," that "youth newspapers that are this bad don't deserve to have a young generation as good as it is," while others will use a much more serious tone in warning about more essential matters: "Certain supposedly young people's publications and supposedly young people's institutions act in the name of young people, issuing messages which at the very least are strange, incomprehensible and unacceptable in the obscene language of the street or on the other hand a pretentious and overfastidious vocabulary.... Demonstrating that you cannot pull the wool over the eyes of young people by using

the style and language which supposedly evinces the openness, sincerity, conformity and liveliness of young people, they implant many deep asocial messages, messages of petit bourgeois poseurs and of boors, messages which are actually an attack on the true values of our socialist society" (Dr Stipe Suvar).

Not uncommonly, with various motives, sometimes including some which are not well intentioned, an attempt is made from various quarters to pass off the assertion that for a long time now we have had an open ideological conflict between the youth and student press on the one hand and society on the other. Those we have talked to in several offices of youth newspapers, and then youth leaders and other political workers say, however, that there are no conflicts in that relationship. Yet no one disputes that there are conflicts, and everyone is interested in seeking out their true roots.

Misunderstandings in Need of Clarification

In ascertaining the social framework and reasons which make it possible for excesses to occur in a youth or student newspaper, it would seem most interesting to examine the relationship between the newspaper and its founder--the youth organization. After all, by the logic of things the youth organization ought to stand in a "blood relationship" to its newspaper. It seems, however, that this is not always the case.

"The youth organization is concerned with its newspaper only after the 'searchlights are turned on,'" says Zoran Erak, editor in chief of MLADOST. "When something which the leaders in the youth organization are absolutely against has already happened, then the youth leaders come on the scene. At this point there are several interesting things. The first is that the young people themselves very rarely furnish the initiative for a ban, criticism or possible recommendations of certain actions to be taken.

"The initiative usually comes from the other side for the simple reason that the youth organization behaves as though it is castrated at precisely the moments when some decision has to be made. And the rule is that in moments when the knot of an exaggeration has to be resolved, the youth organizations stand aloof from their newspapers, at times taking a position that is utterly opportunistic. What is it in the political leadership of young people," Zoran Erak asked, "that compels it to squat behind the corner and from that position take pot shots at what is already under fire?"

Like Galvanized Frogs

Does this mean that "the hands" of the youth organization have always been "clean" concerning all the lapses there have been in the youth press in recent years? Members of the editorial staffs of youth and student newspapers say that the youth organizations by and large cautiously put the questions: "What will the comrades from the party say about that?" "We ought to wait for action by the Socialist Alliance of Working People."

Does this mean that the youth organization is actually behaving like a galvanized frog, which reacts only after someone else has provided electric current by putting in the plug? The question arises of where the publication boards of the various newspapers have been when there were misunderstandings? After all, they are that "mild filter" which has some sort of ideological and conceptual control over the "messy" newspaper.

"It is a big problem to get together all members of the publication board in one place several times a year," says Andrej Pengov Bitenc, editor in chief of MLADINA in Ljubljana. "It is rare for the newspapers to have any benefit from these publication boards. Everything revolves around the assessment 'that the newspaper has improved considerably over the past period' or certain general and blanket judgments are made."

It is a fact that between the youth organizations and their newspapers there is lacking that necessary confidence and solidarity in public expression. But it seems to be the fate of the youth and student newspapers that they present their attitudes toward the everyday truth of the young generation, fighting for their views, sometimes even making serious mistakes, and that only after a mistake does the youth organization emerge as the passenger who is buying a ticket for a train which has already passed through the railroad station. Put in a word, the youth organization does not have or, better put, refuses to have an essential role in guiding and creating the course followed by the messy writers.

Sources of Careerism

In what manner should society, in the opinion of young people, show its concern about the youth and student press, and, specifically, why does the youth organization withdraw "underground," when in fact it ought to bear a share of the responsibility on its shoulders?

"Society and the youth organization ought not to be much concerned with the youth press in the way they have become accustomed to," says Pero Kvesic, editor in chief of PITANJA. "For instance, when there is discussion of the youth press, then certain responsible people say: 'Every year we are giving them so much and so much money,' which is the case. But why wave this like a banner of a relationship which is why they are in their present situation. For example, why should society not appropriate from certain funds the money to help a newspaper get on its feet and get along without constant 'support.' In that case relations would be more democratic.... It should also be said that the so-called excesses in the youth press are not a reflection of a conflict between young people and society, but of the lack of contact between young people and the youth organization. After an excess has occurred, the leaders of the youth organization 'attack' their own newspaper out of utter careerism. It is nothing rare for a youth organization to start a newspaper so that its leaders can be praised in the appropriate places for having 'done a great deal of work' and certainly in order to win political points. They are followed by other youth leaders,

and as evidence that they are doing something as well, in that same newspaper they 'take care of a nest of doubting Thomases.' Another important problem of the student and youth press is that a man who has never worked on a newspaper is often appointed editor in chief. As if this were a case of agitprop. Then he often interviews and photographs the youth leader and 'everything is as it should be with the newspaper.' But in fact they are contracting anemia, and though they are not under fire for being undesirable, they do more damage than benefit."

"In the abundance of reasons why misunderstandings come about with the youth and student press certainly we should not forget that the editors who are appointed do not have ambitions as newsmen, and from their editor's chairs they are looking ahead to some other position, usually a political position," says Milomir Kragovic, editor in chief of OMLADINSKE NOVINE. "Nor is it surprising that this is the case: it is more lucrative and rewarding to be a politician than a newsman today. All editors of this 'manipulated' type are aware that those who cause problems will not move up the next step."

Zoran Franicevic, editor in chief of POLET, says that the youth leaders have been striving all the while to turn the youth press into their political preserve and by no means have they intended to raise cactus "in their garden."

"Yet I nevertheless think," Franicevic says, "that the youth press is dependent on the youth forums both materially and in other ways. And it would be much better if it were dependent upon young people."

[10 Jul 80, p 5]

[Text] Various Phases and Two Phrases

Ilya Ehrenbourg was a newsman in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. Later he told how once when he was watching a film he was disappointed, disturbed and almost exasperated that the young people in the theater were whistling, shouting and chanting, but then a moment later he remembered: "After all, these are the heroes who tomorrow will die on the Jarama and the barricades of Madrid!"

This story was told us by Bogdan Pesic, the dean of Yugoslav journalism, when we asked him what he thought about the "misunderstandings" which arise in the youth and student press. Not even today's generations, Bogdan Pesic feels, leave us many dilemmas nor reasons for concern. Countless times today's young generations, or, put better, all generations since the war, have shown their high level of awareness and loyalty to this society. Well, then, why do the excesses occur? The young people are against injustice, string-pulling, and social inequities, and that is why we charge them with being messy and irresponsible and with spitting on everything that has the features of self-management socialism. It would be more interesting to

talk about who in our society is afraid of a "messy" press. I say that freer writing in the youth newspapers greatly frightens the bureaucrats and no one else.

An Overcoat Too Small

Two opinions are heard most frequently when the youth press is discussed. First: any good youth newspaper, regardless of the society and system, must be banned at least once, and second, young people in their newspapers do not know what they want, but they want it immediately!

None of those we talked to agreed in principle with either of these two theses. After all, as they put it, the youth press has too many problems for them all to be crammed in these two phrases.

"One substantial problem of the youth press is that the leadership of the youth organization wants to make a traditionalist and regulation newspaper from 'its' newspaper, a newspaper that will 'follow' youth officials from meeting to meeting and on their trips and publish their mouthings," says Mile Stojic, editor in chief of LICA. "Yet only the youth organization as a whole can and should state what kind of newspaper it wants. As for us in the editorial offices of youth and student newspapers, we feel that the youth press, the way it is today, is sound. This does not, of course, mean that it couldn't be better."

"If we are to talk solely about the most important problems of the youth or student press, the conversation might go on endlessly!" says Zoran Franicevic, editor in chief of POLET. "If there really is a need for the existence of newspapers of this kind, then why should only the leadership of youth organizations and the youth leaders ask what sort of physiognomy these newspapers should have? Why should their content not be decided on by the foundry worker, the steel worker, and the secondary school student? After all, it is primarily for them that we publish the newspaper!"

The point of departure frequently taken in official conversations is the very erroneous thesis that the "youth press" is more competent if it more closely resembles the "serious newspapers." It is logical, however, that young people and their newspapers have their own specific view of this world and of social events. Mirjana Kasapovic, newswoman and editor at POLET, has her own way of talking about this. She puts the question whether youth leaders want the youth newspapers to tell the truth as young people see and experience it or whether they want to make of [illegible]spapers some sort of castrated ideological preserve?

A Board That Provides No Advice

"There is another question I would put," Mirjana says. "How is it that the youth leaders, not only when it is a question of the newspapers, are in favor of amateurism and a voluntary effort, while they themselves sit in comfortable chairs and have personal incomes which are better than decent?"

Speaking about the problems of the youth press, those who are directly connected with it regularly begin the conversation with editorial policy and the formal existence of publication boards. In so doing they start with the fact that in principle the publication board consists of more experienced political, cultural and public figures, people who could be of great benefit to young newsmen and editors.

"My view is that it is a rare youth or student newspaper that has a publication board in the true sense of the word," said Nikola Gomilec, editor in chief of STUDENTSKI LIST ("S. L."), the publication of the students of Zagreb University. "In a formal sense those boards do exist, but they fall far short of performing their true function. Many members of the boards are only there as supervisors to be sure that excesses do not occur. And so long as there are no excesses, the board is satisfied and feels that the newspaper is a good one. The extent and kind of work these boards do is best indicated by the datum that in the bans and conflicts that have taken place so far not a single editorial office has ever been right, excepting for the case of Sarovic at POLET. This demonstrates both the democratic spirit and mutuality of relations between the editors of the paper and the board. The members of the publication board of a youth newspaper find it hard to sympathize with 'their' newspaper. As if they feel that they are there only as overseers to see that a nest of suspicious characters is not formed around the newspaper."

"The publication boards rarely meet and do not pay the necessary attention to their newspapers," says Zoran Erak, editor in chief of MLADOST. "The publication board is therefore mainly a 'representative' of the youth forum, which often wants at all costs to 'institute' in the youth newspaper a bureaucratic peace, an atmosphere in which the youth press is supposed to record events, instead of encouraging the editors to show the bravery of youth, sometimes even beyond the 'tale,' in stating its opinion concerning everything that happens in our society."

Cadres, Cadres....

There are people who think that perhaps a more fortunate solution would be if young people ran their own newspapers exclusively on an amateur basis. The creation of professional editorial staffs, it is thought, takes away the keenness of youth and enthusiasm in the sense of creativity.

Cadres have been and have remained one of the large problems of the youth press. The fact is, however, that the editorial staffs of youth newspapers have always given birth to exceptional writers, newsmen, journalists and political figures. It is for precisely that reason, says Srdjan Dizdarevic, chairman of the Commission for Information in the Republic Conference of the Socialist Youth League of Bosnia-Hercegovina, that we should think more carefully and attentively about cadres in the youth personnel and about "nurturing" them.

"I had never been involved with newspaper work before, and then the comrades came from the University Committee and appointed me editor in chief of TRIBINA," says Sreco Zajc, managing editor of MLADINA of Ljubljana. "It is not so important whether I am a fortunate or unfortunate combination, as it is fatal for all other personnel to be chosen in this way!"

Zoran Franicevic, editor in chief of POLET, says that the youth press (and also the youth organization) frequently receives "random personnel" who afterward, if they are subject to the winds of the cultural marketplace, easily become the prey of that marketplace.

NASI DANI, newspaper of the youth of Bosnia-Hercegovina, today has fewer and fewer problems of conception and personnel and fewer editorial problems.

"Five or 6 years ago there were objections to the editorial policy. Today there are none. The reason is simple: the view was taken that NASI DANI is nothing outside or above the youth organization and outside the interests of young people," says Emir Habil, editor in chief and managing editor of this publication.

Is this the "formula" for fewer misunderstandings and fewer excesses, but also for tedium in the youth press? Certainly it is one of the conditions, but assuredly not the only one.

7045
CSO: 2800

WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Aug 80 p 10

[Article by Johann Georg Reissmueller: "Where Does the Power Reside After Tito?"]

[Text] Some people inside Yugoslavia and many outside are waiting for a new leader to emerge from the Yugoslavian leadership, a successor to Tito. It is useless to wait. In all probability, Yugoslavia will be ruled collectively for a long time to come. The institution of the dominant ruler is not built into the ideology of the Yugoslavian self-administering socialist system. What served as a bridge between theory and practice in the Tito era was the historical circumstance which allowed one man, namely Tito, to obtain prominent importance for the socialist movement in Yugoslavia and for the new state created by it so that the Yugoslavian party and the state led by it were one with Tito. Roughly, that would be the answer to questions which, if asked a Yugoslav, would not be received positively.

But Tito is no more and there is no personality in Yugoslavia to whom this historical, exceptional legitimation could be transferred. The politicans at the top appear to be in agreement that this type of position will not be accorded to any of them. If they wanted to, they could also turn to the people, who would not be inclined to favor a continuation of the monarchy in the form of another person; dissatisfaction by intellectuals, including those in the party, could be expected.

The New Core of Power

A powerful and ambitious party leader might be able to overcome all this. But then he would arrive at a second, more difficult barrier: Yugoslavian federalism, which in Yugoslavia today is the second basic political reality along with the rulership of a party and which not only signifies far-reaching autonomy of the individual republics but rather also the formation of power at the top of the central state from the republics. The long time single-handed rulership by Tito did not fit in with this principle. The contradiction was kept quiet. At times he was somewhat overbilled by pointing out that Tito did not belong to any of the Yugoslavian nations as the son of a Croat and a Slovenian and because he viewed his mission as a comprehensively Yugoslavian one, he commandingly unified all nations into one.

But even if one ruler is now not possible in Yugoslavia, then the country has to be led by many. The word "collective leadership" to some appears to be the answer to all questions about the government system in Yugoslavia today. It is indeed an answer but it is an incomplete one. For what kind of collective is it supposed to be; how is it formed; how is the power distributed; how are the authorities distributed within it? One could conceive of the leadership organs which were already extolled during the months of Tito's agony in Belgrade: the Presidium of the republic and the Party Presidium. The latter--occupied on a party basis by the party organizations of the six republics, as well as the two autonomous provinces in addition to a representative of the party organization in the army--is naturally the highest ranking office in the communist single party state of Yugoslavia. But its arithmetic composition and more so its scope--23 members--make it difficult to conceive that the Party Presidium could indeed be the operative leadership of the country; for this purpose it gathers too infrequently. The Party Presidium seems more to have the function of determining the orientation of policy, of making sure that the appropriate organs observe this policy and of formulating personnel decisions at the highest levels of the party and state apparatus.

The State Presidium, called the "Presidium of the Republic," appears to be much more capable of acting. One representative of each republic and of the autonomous provinces, in all eight, are members of it. One could conceive of a group of this size which actually leads Yugoslavia. But even so, the State Presidium today is constituted by a group of men, half of whom already receded into the background in the seventies because of old age or because of their insufficient political flexibility. Therefore, this institution is almost equivalent to that of an honorary group. Furthermore, it is lacking in an important element: the State Presidium is not a party organ even though its members have high party ranks. To the extent that the party views itself as Leninist in Yugoslavia it is difficult for power to reside in an institution which does not formally belong to the party but rather to the state, namely the second lower stage of the supremancy in a communist country.

This is not due to a type of bureaucratic formalism on the highest levels. Moreso, the problem of the legitimacy of power is raised in this case: all self-administering socialist systems have not yet changed the fact that the Yugoslavian party is searching for its justification to rule in the party apparatus and not in the people according to its deeds and also still according to its words.

Therefore, it is obviously not the party Presidium and not the State Presidium which constitute the core of power in Yugoslavia today. It appears as if a small, informal circle of important leaders arrive at the most important political decisions: the Croat Bakaric, the Serb Minic, the Slovenian Dolanc, the Macedonian Grlickov, as well as Defense Minister General Ljubicic, also a Serb like Minic. They all belong to the Party Presidium (Bakaric as the only one among them also in the State Presidium);

therefore, there is no difficulty with the ideological legitimacy. As a result of its multinational composition, the group corresponds to the notion of Yugoslavian federalism which is a building block principle for the state as well as for the party.

Naturally, one should not view the circle as being hermetically sealed--changes, replacements in membership should occur, for example, should a member of the group lose the basis of power in his republic's party organization. The group is also not organized as an institution. Apparently, it exercises its power primarily by the fact that its members vote on matters formlessly and then the result is presented commonly or individually at the regular party organizations or to individual politicians. It can very well be that the decisions reached by this group very often are externally integrated into the meetings of the two highest leadership organs of Yugoslavia which also meet together.

Ruling, having supreme power, dilutes into a simple idea if it is not connected to actual day-to-day governing. Accordingly, virtually up to the end, Tito took an important part in the daily government activities, primarily with respect to foreign policy, which he regulated into the last details (to such an extent that most Yugoslavian foreign ministers were essentially Tito's State Secretaries), but also military policy in which the marshall of the partisan war also felt at home.

New Decision-Making Procedure

Some of this has been carried over to the close circle of today's powerful men. Defense Minister Ljubicic directs the entire military apparatus, including the information gathering services. Minic, who was foreign minister for a time in the seventies and who also remained Tito's most important foreign policy advisor after he had to resign from this office for reasons of health, today probably directs Yugoslavian diplomacy more closely than just laying down the official line. Grlickov appears to be a type of manager for the relations to world communism. Dolanc and perhaps even Bakaric, whose favorite field is ideology, have an effect on domestic policy which assuredly goes beyond a general formulation of policy direction. But all in all, these leaders are not tied as directly into government activities as Tito was.

As a result, the formal Yugoslavian central government, the "Federal Executive Council," gains in importance. There is also another factor involved here. Among the most important leaders in Yugoslvaia today, not one of them is well acquainted with economic policy or even with economics at all. Bakaric, a trained lawyer, has taken up the economic issue but more from an ideological and theoretical point of view. To this extent this group also proves itself to be the heirs of Tito in another, uncommon fashion--the marshall was also quite uninterested in economics. Informed people knew that Tito should have devalued the dinar and that he viewed the closure of nonprofitable operations as unsocialist and, therefore, rejected the proposals. But because economic realities could not be

argued in the light of this, some political decisions with respect to the economy were not made. The odd apathy and bulkiness of Yugoslavian economic reforms over the past few decades can be explained in this light, although not totally. But now the economy is demanding its long delayed rights.

Amid such circumstances, the government, to which numerous economic and financial experts belong, is emerging from the shadows of the Party and the State Presidium in which it has stood until now. And even the expert commissions of the Parliament addressing themselves to economic questions are gaining in influence as a part of critical cooperation with the government. The government decided upon a massive devaluation of the dinar after hearing the advice of the financial experts, primarily of the National Bank. Thereupon, it obtained the advice of the authorized parliamentary committee; then it presented its decision to the Party and State Presidiums at a common session. The danger of making a mistake, therefore, was kept low--who would have wanted to take objection to a decision permeated with expert opinions in an urgent matter? In the future, decisions will possibly be reached more and more in a similar fashion--in economic policy and in other areas in which political voluntarism and even the ideology confront the narrow boundaries of the possible.

Therefore, at the top in Yugoslavia there is an informal, collective center of power. But it is embedded in the two formal institutions of leadership, seeing itself more and more dependent upon the government, which is increasing in economic authority and is committed to the federalist order which is both the consequence and expression of the multinational status of the country.

9527
CSO: 2300

WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON NEED TO REFORM SYSTEM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Jul 80 p 8

[Article by Viktor Meier: "Reform of System Needed--What the Yugoslav Economy Requires"]

[Text] Belgrade, July--People again take gift parcels to Yugoslavia--almost like in the fifties, only more selectively containing coffee, detergents, soap, medicaments, sugar and oil. The border crossing at Spielfeld presents an unusual picture: hosts of people on foot with bags or knapsacks on their way from the Yugoslav side to the first Austrian stores and returning fully laden. On Friday nights, with the "flood of tourists" from the north, the sight is not so idyllic: on the Austrian side cars are lined up for 10 kilometers, all the way to Leibnitz. There is a 3-hour waiting time. The reason: Yugoslav customs officers are methodically searching the cars, which also carry many Yugoslav foreign workers from Germany, for goods they are bringing in. The sight of the long line of cars does little to promote Yugoslavia as a tourist country, though tourism is one of the country's most important sources of foreign currency.

A Search for Scapegoats?

Economic difficulties, of which the supply problems are but the most striking evidence, are becoming more pressing and are causing nervousness among the new "collective leadership." There is no longer a Tito who might cover up the faults of the "system" with his personal authority. It is now the "system" alone that is being put to the test. The first political results are already apparent. In Slovenia the head of the government, Vratusa, one-time secretary of Kardelj, has been relieved and replaced by the republic's minister of the interior, Zemljaric. Vratusa had played a vital part in drafting the 1974 constitution, on which the presently prevailing economic system of self-administration is based. Is there already a search for scapegoats going on? The Slovene party head, Popit, has stated without beating around the bush that what is needed in light of the current economic situation

at the head of the country's administration is not theoreticians but people with "operational ability." There are people in Slovenia, however, who point out in light of where Vratusa's successor comes from that there are already enough policemen handling Yugoslav economic policy and that it is now time for people who know something about production to be given a say.

There appears to be yet another angle to Vratusa's being relieved of his post. Not only Vratusa but also Stane Dolanc, at one time executive secretary of the Yugoslav party presidium and now its most important member, comes from Kardelj's circle and was furthered by him in his political career. Will the increasing disinclination of the practical politicians toward the heritage of Kardelj, with his "system theory," also adversely affect the position of Dolanc? One can hear two versions. According to one, Dolanc reportedly dissociated himself in time from Vratusa; according to the other, Slovene party head Popit reportedly gave him to understand that there would be little point in supporting Vratusa. Neither version exactly testifies to Dolanc's having a secure power base in Slovenia. However, a strong position in one's home republic is almost essential in the present circumstance in light of the increased importance of republics for any Yugoslav politician who is seeking prominence in the federal government.

The growing power of the republics, particularly as regards economic policy, is a reason why the concomitant measures planned for the devaluation of the dinar were decided but slowly. As regards price controls, which are supposed to curb the inflationary effect of the devaluation, they evidently have to be increasingly weakened under the pressure of individual interests. This was only to be expected, because for political reasons it is simply impossible to combat inflation in Yugoslavia effectively. What weighs much more heavily is the fact that the stimulating effect of the devaluation on exports, and thus on the procurement of foreign currency, has become a reality only in part and already threatens to disappear again, which would make it necessary to have another devaluation before long. In the first 4 months of this year, exports were 40 percent higher than the year before, while imports increased by only 16 percent. This was a positive result but while it was promoted by the devaluation, it did not have the desired effect of a "breakthrough."

Such a "breakthrough," in the view of many Yugoslavs and even many officials of the regime, appears possible only through a radical change in the system. This realization, remarkable for a communist country, has gained in momentum, including political momentum, in the past few weeks almost by leaps and bounds. It is, however, coupled with the just as momentous fear that basic reforms of the system might have incalculable consequences for the whole character of the regime. Reforms could be directed only toward basic liberalization, expanded autonomy of self-administered enterprises, a strengthening of the market and greater freedom for the private sector, in trade as well as agriculture. A

return to dogmatic forms of economic control is not even under discussion in the party's reactionary wing in Yugoslavia. The model of countries such as Romania and Bulgaria is too much in evidence, and there is also too great a fear lest a detour via a planned economy might lead willy-nilly into the Soviet power sphere.

There is, however, also great resistance against the "liberal" way. Yet the economic situation is poor, and the dissatisfaction of the population might have unpleasant political consequences. Devaluation cannot solve Yugoslavia's economic problems any more than can the agreement with the EEC. Unless one succeeds in increasing the productivity and ability to compete of Yugoslav enterprises, the problems can always only be solved on the surface, and the only way Yugoslavia could then participate in the international market is constant devaluation and inflation.

Little Happens in Practice

The officials, all the way up to the top of the "collective leadership," appear to be fairly helpless in the face of this phenomenon. Under Tito, the economy was pushed into the background, no one could pursue a political career in that field, and economic leaders were suspect among political officials as "technocrats" and possible competitors. Now the political officials find themselves alone as the persons responsible, and the party largely of their resolutions has little effect.

The question of responsibility evidently is beginning to occupy the top leadership. The acting president of the State Presidency, Mijatovic, recently addressed this problem briefly when he opened a new bridge to the island of Krk at Rijeka. He said that he did not want to diminish the responsibility "of the superior organs in the sociopolitical associations," but he looked at once for guilty parties in the purely technological sector, among those who were hoarding goods or were "unjustifiably" raising prices. Here too apparently, as in Slovenia, the first call went out to the police. One hears in the larger towns that arrests for alleged economic offenses have increased again.

Some politicians, however, are beginning to see the problems in more basic terms. Not least among them are the dominant Serbian personages, Dragoslav Markovic and head of government Ivan Stambolic. In speeches and even in conversations with foreign correspondents, they say that certain things ought to be done "at long last." One hears, for example, that it is "urgently necessary" for funds to remain primarily with the enterprises, that the "market forces" ought to be given full rein, that private initiative, in trade as well as agriculture, must be handled no longer as something of an enemy but as an indispensable pillar of society.

Hardly anything happens in practice, however. The political problems hidden behind all these overtures for reform are evidently too great. The demand, for example, that "at long last" earned funds should mainly

remain with the enterprises sounds good but would mean a strong reduction of taxes and other fees for "social administration," that is, for the state. Who in that case is to finance the socialist state and the party, the controls of the state, its huge police apparatus and its excessive foreign political pretensions?

Bakaric, at present recovering from an operation at Tito's former Slovene headquarters in Brdo, implored the officials a year ago to realize at long last that economic questions are also political questions. One gets the impression that the question of the economy before very long may become the subject of the first serious differences of opinion among the new leadership.

8790
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WESTER. PAPER NOTES CAMPAIGN AGAINST OPPOSITION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in Germa[illegible]0 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Viktor Meier: "Campaign Against Oppositionists in Yugoslavia--The Efforts of One Party Wing Within the 'Collective Leadership'"]

[Text] Belgrade, 29 July--The campaign in Yugoslavia against Milovan Djilas and other so-called "oppositionists" is assuming ever greater dimensions. At the same time it is noticeable that by and large it is a certain wing of the "collective leadership" that wants to fuel this campaign at all costs and to raise it to the level of "legal measures," as the executive secretary of the party presidium, Dragosavac, puts it. Foreign observers are somewhat at a loss in the face of this eruption since there appears to be no reason for a general tightening of the party line and since, if it reverted to a policy of condemnations, Yugoslavia would again lose a good deal of the good will it gained everywhere in the wake of Tito's illness and death. One gains the impression that dogmatic elements supported by part of the police apparatus would like to take advantage of the serious illness of informal "coordinator" Vladimir Bakaric for a change in the political climate.

It is by no means only a question of Djilas. To proceed against him, incidentally, would not make much sense at present, for he probably has just about given all the interviews he is going to give and his biographical book about Tito is already available abroad. In some areas of Yugoslavia, primarily in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, there is an increasing trend of issuing extremely harsh prison sentences, sometimes for several years, even for minor offenses. This questionable judicial procedure has also claimed as its victims a couple of young Franciscans, Friars Vidovic and Jurodic, who got 6 years in prison for allegedly possessing "hostile literature." A different standard apparently is being applied in other republics, and the regime, if anything, otherwise tries to avoid open confrontations with the church. In Bosnia, on the other hand, politicans constantly talk of the danger of an "internal and external enemy" and of a "special war" being allegedly waged from the West, primarily by emigre circles there.

But Croatia too has had its show trial. In Samobar a group of people were condemned under highly questionable circumstances to lengthy imprisonment for possession of arms and other allegedly hostile actions. In Zagreb many persons are of the opinion that the confessions of guilt did not occur in the proper manner. Among other things, people recall the "bomb trial" of about 5 years ago at which at first death sentences were meted out but concerning which there is now increasing evidence of meager proof of the defendants' guilt. During the appeal proceedings in the fall of 1978, the court expressly took note of the defendants having been badly maltreated. The only thing the judge refused to do was also to have the names of the accused police officers entered in the record. This case in turn has long since been pending at the Croatian Supreme Court, which is constantly putting off its verdict despite the fact that the defendants have been serving time in the meanwhile. Apparently it regards the moment as too "delicate," for it is hardly likely that after all the revelations it will be possible to maintain the charge.

In Croatia the question of the political police is closely connected with the national problem. The Serbian element, at home primarily in the poor countryside of Lika and having played the role of "victor" both after the partisan war and again after Tito's intervention in Croatia in 1971, constitutes only about 16 percent of the population of the republic but is overrepresented both in the party and in the security apparatus. At present the strongest politicians in Croatia after Bakaric--Dragosavac and Baltic--are Serbs and, like the majority of communists of Serbian nationality in Croatia, belong to the dogmatic wing of the party.

Likewise indirectly as a result of 1971, none of the Croatian politicians, including the younger ones, is managing to make a sizable impression. This state of affairs is causing bitter comments among the population of Zagreb. Careful note has also been taken of the fact that so far just about only Dragosavac and Baltic have advocated arrests and strictly vetoed even mild demands for liberalization coming from intellectual circles. Some speeches by Baltic have been so abusive that they were not even published.

Police mentality sometimes bears strange fruit. In Dubrovnik a citizen, a baker by trade, was given a prison sentence--albeit a suspended one--for having made propaganda for reestablishment of the old Republic of Dubrovnik. This was held to be "antistate activity." The Republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) had been abolished by Napoleon in 1808.

In the past few days Dragosavac has attacked intellectuals twice in a row. In Belgrade a group of professors had advocated economic reforms, and in Slovenia intellectuals objected to the control of cultural activities. But what the reactionary elements in the party appear to fear most is discussions about preserving human rights in Yugoslavia. This is where Dragosavac expressed himself in particularly strong terms.

It is certainly no coincidence that Amnesty International apparently has now decided to devote greater attention to the situation in Yugoslavia. There still exist in Yugoslavia punishable so-called "verbal offenses," that is, sentences for having made comparatively innocuous remarks. Instead of doing away with this at long last, as in fact even many politicians are demanding, the prosecution for such offenses, which particularly invites denunciations, is even being intensified. Just recently a high school teacher in Serbia was sentenced for having remarked privately that workers' self-administration existed only on paper.

The new "collective leadership" wants to solve its economic problems in principle with rather liberal measures, and it desires a policy of good relations with the European neighboring countries. In Petrinja last Sunday, Dragosavac made comments on this subject which, if implemented as part of the general political line of the country, would come down to a kind of "Romanization" of Yugoslavia--in other words, a combination of a brutal police regime at home and an independent foreign policy. Noninterference, Dragosavac said, is a prerequisite for any cooperation. There then followed violent attacks against people demanding domestic political liberalization. This is matched by the language used, for instance, by the Zagreb paper VJESNIK, which, at least as far as domestic politics are concerned, is often Dragosavac's mouthpiece: deviators such as Djilas are "worms," the paper said.

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